LA LETTRE DU KOTRA Août - Septembre 2001
Centre Coréen du Commerce Extérieur et des Investissements
KOTRA PARIS - 36, avenue Hoche - 75008 Paris Téléphone : 01.42.25.09.57 - Télécopie : 01.42.25.09.50 - email : kotra@wanadoo.fr M. Seong-Kuk Hong - Directeur Adjoint M. Frédéric Claveau - Responsable investissements
OUVERTURE DE LA CHASSE AUX PROJETS EN COREE !
Fin novembre, début décembre 2001, la KOTRA organise à Séoul une rencontre entre les entreprises françaises et les gouvernements régionaux .Ces derniers présenteront leurs projets, parmi, lesquels :
1°- Séoul : création d'un parc industriel dédié aux industries des média, des loisirs ('entertainment') et des technologies de l'information2°- Busan : développement d'une zone de fret et de logistique pour le port de Busan, 1er port coréen
3°- Busan : création d'un parc naturel autour de Busan pour la protection de la faune et de la flore, avec une rivière en eaux vives, marais salans, pisciculture, réserve marine, ferme pour crocodiles
4°- Daegu : construction d'un bâtiment visant à abrîter d'une part les services régionaux du commerce extérieur ainsi qu'un hôtel 5 étoiles.
Pour les entreprises intéressées par cette présentation, n'hésitez pas à nous contacter.
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET BILATERALES L'expansionnisme commercial chinois inquiète l'Asie L'Asie du Sud-Est s'enfonce dans le rouge Les Coréens immigrés au Japon : comment les ex-parias prennent leur revanche Businesses Pushed Tokyo-Seoul Free Trade Korean thaw POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE, MACRO-ECONOMIE ET RESTRUCTURATIONS Étude économique de la Corée, 2001 FMI - OCDE Séoul devrait accélérer les restructurations La Corée souffre de ses dépendances South Korea's growth slows High Dependency on Key Products Hurting Korea's Export Performance China Rises as Second Biggest Export Mart Exports Not Suffering from U.S. Crisis: Minister Korea Rises as 3rd Largest FDI Market in Asia Foreign Investment Attraction Program Starts Foreign investors focus on financial statements Gov't to lower 'foreign investment district' requirement to $50 million REITs Real Estate Investment Made Easy An overview of the newly introduced REITs in Korea SECTEURS ECONOMIQUES Management, questions interculturelles Society Facing Ideology Crisis Vertical Integration Toward Globalization Finance, banque et bourse Hyundai Securities : bras de fer entre AIG et Séoul Technologies de l'information D'ici à 2003, les consommateurs asiatiques domineront le Web Start-Up Investors May Get Compensation for Losses Industrie des composants - électronique LCD industry in Korea Transport : automobiles, transports ferroviaires et aériens Automakers vow to attain exports of 1.68 mil. Cars Le gouvernement sud-coréen veut régler la vente de Daewoo avant la fin du mois GM doit signer aujourd'hui la lettre d'intention pour la reprise de Daewoo GM Makes Final Offer for Daewoo GM-Daewoo Motor Deal in Final Stage: Jin Nyum GM to Sign Daewoo Deal Today; To Buy Research Center, Other Key Facilities Korea Says GM-Daewoo Deal Done GM's takeover of Daewoo seen hurting Hyundai, Kia BMW establishes financial services unit in Korea Construction d'une liaison ferroviaire entre la Russie et la Corée du sud L'armée de l'air coréenne hésite entre le Rafale et le F15 Sécurité aérienne : les Etats-Unis classent la Corée du Sud dans les pays à risque Industries agro-alimentaire Seoul to Sell 20% Stake in KT&G Abroad in Sept. ENTREPRISES COREENNES Malgré sa détermination, Séoul peine à restructurer ses conglomérats Successful restructuring cases of domestic companies Hyundai Motor accelerates global management HanbitSoft Gets Global Games Going SK : emerging as Integrated Energy Conglomerate Samsung défie les sceptiques Hynix : le sort du coréen Hynix suspendu au soutien des banques ENTREPRISES FRANÇAISES La Société Générale somme le coréen Hynix de payer ses dettes Samsung electronics to benefit from winning handset supply contract for Orange sa Samsung, Orange Sign Mobile Phone Contract French Firm's Faulty Turbines Cost Boryeong Plant W1 tril. La Corée réclame 52,8M$ à ALSTOM pour défaillance matériel
L'EXPANSIONNISME COMMERCIAL CHINOIS INQUIETE L'ASIE
Encore convalescente après la crise de 1997, l'Asie de l'Est connaît un net ralentissement économique, voire une récession comme à Singapour ou Taiwan. La montée en puissance de la Chine, qui inonde les marchés de ses produits, handicape son industrialisation.
Toujours convalescentes, après la crise financière de 1997, les économies émergentes d'Asie assistent avec inquiétude à la montée en puissance commerciale de la Chine. Principal baromètre, les investissements directs étrangers qui prennent la direction de la région Asie-Pacifique sont pour l'essentiel absorbés par la Chine (plus de 80 %), privant les autres nations en développement d'une manne précieuse pour la poursuite de leur redressement. Pékin, qui apparaissait comme un facteur de stabilité dans la région il y a quatre ans, joue aujourd'hui davantage comme une menace économique.
Main-d'oeuvre à bas prix. " La Chine inonde les autres pays asiatiques de ses produits et coupe ainsi l'herbe sous le pied aux industries locales, et cela risque d'être irrattrapable ", analyse Alain de Sacy, consultant et chargé de cours à HEC, qui souligne au passage qu'" il s'agit souvent de contrebande ".
Jouissant d'une main-d'oeuvre à bas prix, la Chine noie littéralement les marchés dans la masse de ses produits vendus 50 % moins cher. Le Laos, le Vietnam, la Birmanie sont particulièrement touchés. Mais la Thaïlande, Singapour, l'Indonésie et les Philippines n'échappent pas non plus à l'invasion de textiles, chaussures et autres articles ménagers. " A Hanoi, il y avait dans le quartier des 36 rues tout un artisanat local. Maintenant il n'y a plus que des articles chinois en plastique ", tempête le consultant. Plus dangereux encore, la Chine commence à être présente dans certaines technologies comme les semi-conducteurs, souvent à la faveur des délocalisations opérées par des pays plus avancés.
Fâcheuse coïncidence, les économistes révisent à la baisse les uns derrière les autres leurs prévisions pour cette partie de l'Asie, mais aussi, plus au nord, pour Taiwan et la Corée. L'entrée annoncée en récession de Taiwan, après Singapour, pourrait être le prélude à d'autres déceptions. Déjà, la Thaïlande la craint.
Bien sûr, la Chine est loin d'être la cause exclusive de cette dégradation économique.
Adhésion à l'OMC. Le ralentissement américain puis celui de l'Europe, le marasme continu du Japon et la déprime des secteurs high-tech jouent un rôle capital dans l'incertain rétablissement de l'Asie émergente. Mais la politique expansionniste chinoise n'arrange rien. Son adhésion prochaine à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) ne fera qu'amplifier la tendance : les barrières commerciales entre la Chine et ses partenaires commerciaux vont tomber.
Mais les conséquences de cette adhésion doivent être relativisées : " La balance commerciale chinoise ne va pas s'améliorer immédiatement ", prévoit Sébastien Barbé, économiste à BNP-Paribas, " car la Chine est en phase de modernisation et cela suppose la poursuite d'un courant d'importations en biens d'équipe-ment ". L'économiste observe que Pékin n'est commercialement excédentaire qu'avec les pays riches, mais presque toujours déficitaire avec les principales économies de l'Asean. Tous les pays émergents ne seront pas logés à la même enseigne : " La montée en puissance de la Chine va renforcer la division des tâches entre nations dans la région. " Des Etats comme la Corée, Taiwan ou la Malaisie chercheront à capitaliser sur leur avance dans les industries à valeur ajoutée, le high-tech et les services. Reste à savoir si la Chine se contentera longtemps de jouer l'usine d'assemblage de l'Asie. Laurent Chemineau Source : La Tribune - 22/8/2001
L'ASIE DU SUD-EST S'ENFONCE DANS LE ROUGE
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LES COREENS IMMIGRES AU JAPON : COMMENT LES EX-PARIAS PRENNENT LEUR REVANCHE
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BUSINESSES PUSHED TOKYO-SEOUL FREE TRADE
South Korean and Japanese businesses are fueling a free trade agreement between the two neighboring countries, particularly since both are suffering ongoing economic recessions. In a meeting of the Korea-Japan FTA Business Forum in Seoul yesterday evening, over 30 business leaders of the two countries discussed the effects, problems and strategies relating to the FTA.
The meeting, held for the fifth time, was chaired by Park Yong-sung, president of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry and chairman of Oriental Brewery, and Giro Ushio, chairman of Ushio Electric, at the Seoul Shilla Hotel.
Taking the podium as keynote speaker, Hyosung Chairman Cho Suck-rai said the FTA is an important part of both Korean and Japanese efforts to tide over economic difficulties.
``The FTA will help improve the competitiveness of Korean and Japanese companies by reducing oversupply and speeding up the restructuring process,'' he projected.
At the same time, he noted, such an agreement will increase investments in South Korea by Japanese companies since costs in Korea are considerably lower than they are back in Japan.
However, for the FTA to be realized, the two countries have to unify their import tariffs and establish investment promotion banks to push the transfer of Japanese capital and technology to small and medium Korean companies.
Simultaneously, South Korea and Japan must agree on standard product specifications, provide visa waivers and set up a settlement body to resolve arising disputes, Cho said.
On the other hand, Yoshitaka Ishii, chairman of JR Kyushu, said strategic alliances between Korean and Japanese companies are crucial to help elevate the level of each other's competitiveness.
Meanwhile, Kim Jung, president of Hanwha Distribution, said increases in Japanese investment in South Korea is unlikely even if the FTA is realized, adding that what is more important is for Japan to eliminate its non-tariff barriers.
The Korea-Japan FTA Business Forum will continue to meet periodically through the first half of next year and make a joint recommendation to their governments thereafter.
Source : Korea Times - 7/9/2001
KOREAN THAW
After a six-month hiatus North and South Korea are to hold ministerial-level meetings again. The chances are they will continue to talk past each other
THE AGREEMENT between North and South Korea to resume official talks follows a bout of typical brinkmanship from North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il. This time it was a last-minute attempt to bolster the fortunes of South Korea's top official responsible for relations between the two Koreas, Lim Dong Won. On September 2nd, a day before the South Korean legislature was due to vote on a motion of no confidence in Mr Lim for his alleged softness in handling the North, the government in Pyongyang said it hoped to resume talks with the South as soon as possible. The South was quick to accept the offer, proposing talks in Seoul on September 15th-18th. On September 6th, South Korean officials said that the North had agreed to this.
But Mr Kim's intervention failed in its apparent immediate objective. On Monday the motion condemning Mr Lim was passed, with the help of a small coalition partner of President Kim Dae Jung's Millennium Democratic Party, which voted with the opposition camp. On September 4th the entire South Korean cabinet resigned in order to pave the way for a reshuffle. Three days later, the South's President Kim replaced five of his 22 ministers, including Mr Lim. He will now have to deal with a fortified, and distinctly Pyongyang-phobic, opposition in his dogged efforts to pursue a "sunshine policy" of reconciliation with the North.
But North Korea's swiftly-accepted offer of talks did come in time to cast a rosy glow over this week's visit to the North by China's president, Jiang Zemin. China has been urging its ally to resume official contacts with the South, which it broke off in March to display its anger at America's tougher line towards the North. Optimists saw Mr Jiang's visit, less than a month after an unprecedented official trip to Moscow by Kim Jong Il, as a sign that North Korea could be preparing to renew engagement with the South.
Mr Jiang would be delighted to give the impression that China has a big role to play in easing tensions on the Korean peninsula. That impression was bolstered by Kim Jong Il's unannounced trip to Beijing shortly before his historic summit with Kim Dae Jung in June last year. But in reality China's ability to influence North Korean policy is limited. Notwithstanding the hundreds of thousands of North Koreans mobilised to greet Mr Jiang's motorcade and dance for him at a gaudy evening performance, North Korea feels uneasy about its much more powerful and prosperous neighbour. This was Mr Jiang's first visit to the North in 11 years and his first ever in the seven years of Kim Jong Il's leadership. But he spent only one full day there, with not even a bland joint statement to show for it.
Mr Kim has a lot to thank Mr Jiang for, especially some of the food and fuel that have helped to prevent his famine-stricken country from collapsing. China's fear is of a political meltdown in North Korea that could turn the current stream of North Korean refugees into China into a torrent. For all their misgivings about Mr Kim's bizarre rule, the Chinese see benefit in trying to prop him up. Mr Jiang paid due homage to his host's eccentricities by visiting an ostrich-feed farm. The huge enterprise on Pyongyang's outskirts is one of Mr Kim's pet projects-the idea presumably being to supply his starving people with lean steaks and exotic leather goods.
But China does not want its ties with recalcitrant North Korea to upset relations with more important countries-South Korea, Japan and America. Perhaps for this reason, in their public comments on Mr Jiang's trip, Chinese officials have avoided mention of the American military presence in South Korea and American plans to build defences against ballistic missiles. North Korea waited until September 7th, after Mr Jiang was long gone, for its foreign ministry to repeat its demand for the United States to withdraw its forces, which it called "a pressing issue, the solution of which brooks no further delay".
Yet the missile-defence debate has cast the unlikely Mr Kim as a central actor in one of the big international dramas of the Bush administration. It was North Korea that, in 1998, revived American interest in missile defences, by test-firing a long-range, three-stage missile that it sent skimming over the Japanese archipelago. America insists that its missile-defence plans are directed solely at the threat posed by such "rogue" states (later dubbed, less provocatively, "states of concern"). North Korea is seen as especially dangerous because of its willingness to export missile technology.
China has always suspected that American missile-defence plans are intended at least in part to counter its own nuclear arsenal, and has given warning that, in response, it might have to build up its own arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles.
Clearly, China's arguments against missile defences would be strengthened if the North Korean threat were to diminish. Last year, Mr Kim told the Americans that he was prepared to discuss a comprehensive missile-technology regime, but for a price: he wanted to have North Korean satellites launched by another country; and he demanded compensation of $1 billion a year for at least three years.
The Chinese this week said they were ready for "serious" dialogue on the issue. Some onlookers believe the Chinese will tacitly accept American missile defences while the United States will tacitly accept China's right to maintain a limited nuclear deterrent capable of penetrating the American shield. "There's going to be a basic understanding, a wink and a nod," says Bates Gill of the Brookings Institution in Washington.
Source : The Economist - 7/09/2001
ETUDE ECONOMIQUE DE LA COREE, 2001
La Corée a beaucoup progressé depuis la crise dans la mise en place d'un cadre axé sur le marché et le rétablissement d'une forte croissance économique. Ce cadre doit être efficacement mis en œuvre pour faciliter la restructuration des entreprises et du secteur financier et ne pas gaspiller ce qui a été difficilement acquis à la suite de la crise et de la profonde récession. Bien que des progrès importants aient été réalisés, la restructuration des entreprises devrait être accélérée, grâce notamment en autorisant les entreprises non viables à se retirer du marché. Il importe de veiller à ce que les mécanismes de sortie fonctionnent correctement, afin d'éviter que des entreprises non viables continuent d'absorber des ressources au détriment de leurs concurrents, pesant ainsi sur la croissance potentielle. En outre, la restructuration des entreprises devrait reposer sur un gouvernement d'entreprise dynamique et sur la transparence des procédures en matière de comptabilité, de diffusion de l'information et de vérification des comptes. Les autorités devraient veiller à ce que les garanties de l'État ne faussent pas la concurrence et ne retardent pas non plus la restructuration et elles devraient avancer sur la voie de la privatisation des banques. Des progrès dans la restructuration amélioreraient les chances d'une reprise économique rapide, tout en rendant la Corée moins vulnérable à une crise et en améliorant son potentiel de croissance à long terme. La capacité de croissance de la Corée dépend aussi du maintien de la stabilité macroéconomique, notamment en assurant la crédibilité de la politique de ciblage de l'inflation. Dans cette optique, il serait sans doute préférable d'abandonner les objectifs annuels d'inflation et de se concentrer plutôt sur l'objectif à moyen terme de la banque centrale. Il importe, par ailleurs, de développer un cadre à moyen terme pour la politique budgétaire, qui permet d'intégrer l'ensemble des dépenses publiques et est plus transparent. Il faudra certes laisser jouer les stabilisateurs automatiques pour que la reprise économique puisse s'instaurer, mais une situation budgétaire saine est cruciale pour faire face au coût futur de la coopération Nord-Sud et du vieillissement de la population. Étant donné que la transition démographique sera rapide et que le système actuel de retraite n'en est pas encore à son régime de croisière, l'une des grandes priorités devrait être d'établir un dispositif d'aide aux personnes âgées qui s'appuie davantage sur l'épargne du secteur privé et qui couvre une plus forte proportion de la population. Au total, la plus grande ouverture au marché et l'accélération de la restructuration des entreprises, doublées de mesures visant à assurer la stabilité macroéconomique à long terme, devraient permettre à la Corée de préserver une forte croissance et de poursuivre ainsi sa convergence par rapport aux pays qui ont le revenu le plus élevé.
Quelle était la cause de la récession économique de la fin de l'année 2000 ?
La Corée a connu une forte reprise après la crise de 1997 et la récession de 1998, la production augmentant de près de 11 pour cent en 1999 et de 9 pour cent en 2000. La mise en œuvre d'un large éventail de réformes visant à instaurer une économie de marché a jeté les bases de l'expansion, en stimulant la confiance des investisseurs, en favorisant d'importantes entrées de capitaux et en contribuant à normaliser la situation sur le marché financier. Les actions engagées ont eu notamment pour but de renforcer la concurrence, d'améliorer le gouvernement d'entreprise et de remédier aux difficultés du secteur financier, grâce en partie à l'utilisation de capitaux publics pour résoudre le problème des créances douteuses et recapitaliser les institutions financières. Ce nouveau cadre étant en place, l'économie coréenne a pu bénéficier du dynamisme de la demande mondiale, en particulier dans le secteur des technologies de l'information et des communications (TIC), et sa position concurrentielle s'est améliorée du fait de la dépréciation du taux de change. Les politiques macroéconomiques ont aussi contribué à la vigueur de la reprise.
Le net redressement de l'activité économique coréenne a pris fin au quatrième trimestre de 2000, la production revenant à 1.7 pour cent en taux annuel. Ce ralentissement a été dû à un ensemble de facteurs extérieurs et intérieurs négatifs. Du côté extérieur, la forte hausse des prix du pétrole a eu une incidence majeure sur la Corée, qui dépend des importations pétrolières pour la moitié de ses besoins énergétiques. Le recul correspondant de 12 pour cent des termes de l'échange a limité la croissance du revenu national à 2.3 pour cent. Dans le même temps, la croissance mondiale a marqué le pas, réduisant la demande d'exportations coréennes, en particulier dans le secteur des TIC. Ces exportations en volume, qui s'étaient accrues en rythme annuel de 139 pour cent au deuxième trimestre de 2000, ne progressaient plus que de 40 pour cent au dernier trimestre.
Du côté intérieur, la confiance s'est sensiblement dégradée en 2000, dans le secteur des ménages comme dans celui des entreprises, malgré une croissance de la production de près de 10 pour cent jusqu'au dernier trimestre de l'année. Si la hausse des prix du pétrole a certainement joué un rôle, la dégradation de la confiance semble avoir été liée à l'apparition de certains signes montrant que l'effort de restructuration postérieur à la crise s'essoufflait et que les problèmes auxquels était confrontée l'économie étaient plus importants qu'envisagé initialement. Ce sentiment pouvait s'expliquer par plusieurs facteurs, notamment les suivants. Premièrement, la fourniture de capitaux publics supplémentaires pour la restructuration financière a été, semble-t-il, retardée par les élections du début 2000 et les différends politiques survenus plus tard dans l'année. Bien que l'approbation législative soit finalement intervenue en décembre 2000, ce retard a contribué à la dégradation prononcée des conditions de crédit pour les entreprises en 2000. Deuxièmement, les programmes de réaménagement de la dette des sociétés affiliées à Daewoo ont fait apparaître des niveaux d'endettement considérablement plus élevés, alors que les négociations pour la vente de Daewoo Motors à un grand producteur étranger ont été interrompues en septembre 2000. Troisièmement, l'agitation sociale a témoigné d'une forte opposition à la restructuration. La dégradation de la confiance s'est reflétée dans la chute de la Bourse de Corée, qui a reculé de moitié en 2000, ce qui a eu, à son tour, un effet négatif sur le patrimoine.
Ces facteurs négatifs ont contribué au ralentissement de la consommation privée et de l'investissement fixe en 2000. Le chômage, qui était tombé à 3½ pour cent au milieu de 2000, est passé à plus de 4 pour cent sur une base désaisonnalisée au début de 2001. Les importations se sont aussi ralenties en 2000, la balance des opérations courantes enregistrant ainsi un important excédent de 2 pour cent du PIB. Dans le même temps, l'incidence différée du relèvement des prix du pétrole et des tarifs des services publics a fait passer l'inflation de 2.3 pour cent en 2000 à plus de 4 pour cent au début de 2001.
Quelles sont les perspectives de reprise économique ?
L'économie semble s'être stabilisée au premier trimestre de 2001, la production augmentant de 1 pour cent en taux annuel par rapport au trimestre précédent. En mai, le taux de chômage était revenu aux alentours de 3½ pour cent. En outre, la confiance des entreprises et des ménages s'est redressée, ce qui donne à penser qu'une reprise économique pourrait s'amorcer dans la deuxième moitié de l'année. Une telle évolution dépendra cependant de la relance de l'activité sur les marchés extérieurs, notamment aux États-Unis, qui entrent pour près d'un quart dans les exportations coréennes. Si la reprise se matérialise, une expansion induite par les exportations pourrait faire grimper la croissance économique à près de 4 pour cent environ en 2001 et 5½ pour cent en 2002. Une croissance de ce niveau pourrait être suffisante pour maintenir le taux de chômage au-dessous de 4 pour cent. Les gains salariaux seront vraisemblablement modérés, mais une nouvelle progression de l'emploi devrait conduire à un redressement de la consommation privée, dans le contexte d'une amélioration de la confiance des ménages. La reprise devrait aussi favoriser les importations, l'excédent de la balance des opérations courantes se maintenant à peu près à son niveau actuel. L'inflation devrait se ralentir pour se rapprocher de 3½ pour cent en 2002, à mesure que se dissipe l'incidence de la hausse des prix du pétrole et du fléchissement du won.
Outre l'augmentation de la demande extérieure, les perspectives d'une reprise en Corée sont aussi tributaires d'une restructuration réussie du secteur des entreprises et du secteur financier. Malgré les avancées enregistrées ces quelques dernières années dans l'établissement d'un nouveau cadre juridique et institutionnel, le rythme effectif de la restructuration a été moins rapide qu'escompté. Cela est dû en partie à l'ampleur des problèmes auxquels la Corée a été confrontée au lendemain de la crise. Mais la lenteur de la restructuration tient aussi à la forte opposition des syndicats et, sans doute, à l'anticipation du maintien des aides de l'État, qui auraient pu en différer la nécessité. Le secteur des entreprises, où un grand nombre d'entités connaissent des difficultés financières, reste la préoccupation majeure. Malgré le dynamisme de la croissance, un quart des entreprises ayant fait l'objet d'un audit externe en 1999 et 2000 n'avaient pas engrangé suffisamment de bénéfices pour payer ne serait-ce que les charges d'intérêt sur leur dette, sans parler du remboursement du principal. Les problèmes du secteur des entreprises menacent à leur tour la santé du secteur financier. Remédier aux difficultés qui persistent dans le premier secteur, notamment grâce à la sortie des entreprises non viables, est donc indispensable. Si des effets négatifs à court terme ne sont pas à exclure, comme l'a montré l'effondrement de Daewoo en 1999, l'impuissance à agir crée de toute évidence des incertitudes qui tendent à miner la confiance et risquent d'accroître en fin de compte le coût de la restructuration. De fait, la réalisation de progrès tangibles sur la voie de la restructuration, en particulier dans les cas les plus difficiles, pourraient enclencher un cercle vertueux de renforcement de la confiance, conduisant à une croissance économique plus rapide.
Les garanties gouvernementales peuvent-elles jouer un rôle dans le cas des entreprises en difficulté financière ?
L'économie étant plus largement ouverte aux forces du marché, l'intervention de l'État est désormais beaucoup moins justifiée, même si les autorités doivent continuer de jouer un rôle pour faire face aux risques systémiques apparaissant au cours de la restructuration. L'arrivée à échéance de 65 000 milliards de won d'obligations de société - les trois quarts de l'encours - en 2001, par exemple, est un sujet de préoccupation. Parmi ces titres figurent 25 000 milliards de won d'obligations déclassées, qui ne seront vraisemblablement pas refinancées sur le marché. La concentration des échéances sur une seule année et l'absence d'un marché performant pour une dette médiocrement notée pourraient se traduire par la faillite de beaucoup de grandes entreprises sur une courte période, entraînant ainsi le risque d'une crise systémique sur le marché financier. Pour empêcher que cela se produise, les autorités ont introduit un dispositif d'" obligations garanties " en 2000 afin de permettre le refinancement des obligations de société venant à échéance grâce à des garanties partielles de l'État. Ce dispositif a été maintenu en 2001 et complété par un dispositif de nantissement géré par la Banque coréenne de développement (BCD), institution publique, pour six grandes entreprises, notamment quatre filiales d'Hyundai.
Le dispositif de la BCD comporte certaines clauses de sauvegarde destinées à éviter de soutenir des entreprises non viables. En particulier, les entreprises retenues pour le programme doivent faire approuver leur plan de restructuration par la BCD et les banques créancières. Néanmoins, le recours à une institution publique et à des garanties de l'État pour refinancer les obligations de sociétés en mauvaise posture risque d'émousser le rôle des mécanismes du marché dans la restructuration des entreprises, créant des problèmes d'aléa moral et donnant l'impression que certaines entreprises sont encore trop grande pour faire faillite. Pour limiter ces conséquences négatives, il importe que les dispositifs de la BCD et d'obligations garanties soient limitées dans le temps, conçus de manière à éviter les risques systémiques et destinées aux seuls entreprises montrant de sérieux efforts de restructuration. Il est aussi indispensable d'assurer la transparence quant aux engagements pris et au coût potentiel pour les contribuables. Enfin, la participation des institutions financières aux dispositifs devrait être entièrement volontaire.
Le dispositif de la BCD, qui utilise des garanties de l'État pour les obligations de société, devrait être supprimé en 2001, car la concentration des échéances ne posera plus problème en 2002. En outre, le dispositif d'obligations garanties devrait progressivement disparaître avec le retour à la stabilité des marchés financiers. Cela permettrait aux mécanismes du marché d'influer davantage sur le processus de restructuration des sociétés, notamment la sortie des entreprises non viables. Ces entreprises absorbent des ressources qui pourraient servir à financer des activités plus productives, amputant ainsi les marges bénéficiaires des entreprises en bonne santé et nuit à la concurrence, sur les marchés domestique et étrangers. En octobre 2000, les autorités ont demandé aux banques de revoir la situation de 287 entreprises en difficulté, réinstituant le processus d'évaluation déjà utilisé en juin 1998. A l'issue de ce processus, 29 entreprises ont été placées sous administration judiciaire ou liquidées. Cependant, le nombre d'entreprises évaluées qui ont été considérées comme passibles d'un règlement judiciaire est peu important par rapport aux 563 entreprises qui n'auraient pas accumulé de bénéfices suffisants pour couvrir leurs paiements d'intérêt pendant au moins trois années consécutives. En outre, l'évaluation des entreprises par les institutions financières ne devrait pas intervenir à trente mois d'intervalle, mais se tenir sur une base plus régulière et sans que l'État le demande. Les procédures de liquidation judiciaire devraient être encore améliorées, en partie grâce au système " prêt à l'emploi " introduit récemment, qui limite la durée des procédures légales et donne aux créanciers un plus grand rôle. Par ailleurs, les programmes de réaménagement de la dette, qui ont consisté essentiellement en des allégements, devraient être davantage axés sur la restructuration opérationnelle. Les instruments de restructuration des sociétés, autorisés depuis octobre 2000, pourraient jouer un rôle utile à cet égard.
La nouvelle approche du gouvernement d'entreprise est-elle adaptée ?
Si certaines entreprises connaissent de graves difficultés financières, le dynamisme dont fait preuve ce secteur est néanmoins impressionnant. Le rythme de création d'entreprises a été deux fois plus rapide qu'avant la crise et un nombre croissant des nouvelles entités sont considérées comme des entreprises à haut risque et à fort potentiel. En outre, certains des chaebols encore en activité ont commencé de nouveau à se développer, inversant la chute du nombre moyen de filiales dans les trente premiers conglomérats observée entre 1997 et 2000. Étant donné que l'hypertrophie des chaebols a rendu la Corée vulnérable face à la crise, il importe que les décisions d'expansion soient contrôlées dans le nouveau cadre de gouvernement d'entreprise. Les larges prérogatives dont disposent les principaux propriétaires des chaebols de même que les pratiques traditionnelles coréennes compliquent la mise en œuvre des nouveaux principes de gouvernance. Néanmoins, plusieurs signes positifs peuvent être observés, notamment un plus grand activisme des actionnaires et l'arrivée d'administrateurs externes. Des doutes subsistent, cependant, quant à l'indépendance et à l'influence de ces administrateurs, dont beaucoup sont nommés par l'équipe dirigeante et les propriétaires principaux des chaebols. Le recours au vote cumulé, qui permet aux actionnaires minoritaires de jouer un plus grand rôle dans le choix des administrateurs, devrait être encouragé par la Bourse en tant que bonne pratique de gouvernement d'entreprise. De plus, l'amélioration du gouvernement d'entreprise exige une plus grande transparence, notamment une plus grande fiabilité des audits externes.
Que faudrait-il faire pour mettre en place un système financier davantage basé sur des principes de marché ?
En bref, il faudrait pleinement tirer parti de la plus grande ouverture au marché pour faire progresser la restructuration dans le secteur des entreprises. Cela est particulièrement important car les problèmes dans ce secteur sont inextricablement liés à ceux du secteur financier. De fait, il est évident que le système financier ne pourra retrouver des bases saines aussi longtemps que le risque de crédit et l'instabilité du secteur des entreprises restent importants. Malgré la forte reprise, le secteur bancaire dans son ensemble a enregistré de grosses pertes en 1999 et 2000 du fait de la constitution de provisions pour faire face à de nouvelles augmentations des créances douteuses. L'introduction d'un système prospectif de classement des prêts à la fin de 1999 paraît, néanmoins, aussi en cause. Ce changement a, semble-t-il, encouragé les banques à prendre davantage en compte les risques, les amenant à réduire leurs engagements à l'égard des grandes entreprises, tout en augmentant leurs prêts aux ménages. Dans le même temps, le secteur financier non bancaire s'est considérablement contracté ces quelques dernières années, en raison de la fermeture d'un grand nombre d'institutions. Cette contraction a à son tour contribué à un important recul du marché des obligations de société, sur lequel ces institutions avaient joué un rôle important. Si la plus grande prise de conscience des risques de la part des banques et des investisseurs est une évolution positive, la dégradation des conditions de crédit pour les entreprises est aussi en partie symptomatique des problèmes que continue de connaître le secteur financier.
Pour faire face à ces faiblesses, les autorités ont lancé en septembre 2000 la deuxième phase du plan de restructuration du secteur financier, qui prévoit 40 000 milliards de won de dépenses publiques supplémentaires. La mise en œuvre efficace de ce plan, qui permettrait d'éviter une succession de programmes de restructuration, devrait être une priorité. L'efficacité de la politique monétaire s'en trouverait aussi améliorée (voir ci-après). Les autorités de surveillance devraient faire en sorte que le système prospectif de classement des prêts soit efficacement mis en œuvre, ce qui devrait contribuer à accélérer la restructuration des entreprises. Il importe que le holding financier, qui est devenu opérationnel en avril 2001, avec quatre banques en difficulté, puisse se gérer de façon indépendante et parvenir à la rentabilité afin d'éviter des injections supplémentaires de capitaux publics. Pour cela; il faudra vraisemblablement supprimer des capacités faisant double emploi. Mais la priorité devrait être donnée à la privatisation des banques et au développement d'un système financier de marché. L'État possède désormais un tiers des banques commerciales, ce qui peut faire obstacle à une restructuration du secteur des entreprises induite par les banques. Enfin, il importe de conclure avec succès la restructuration du secteur financier, compte tenu des sommes importantes en jeu. La deuxième phase du programme fera gonfler les dépenses nettes, qui passeront à plus de 130 000 milliards de won, soit un quart du PIB. Le succès de la restructuration accroîtra le montant de ces dépenses publiques pouvant être récupéré. La Société coréenne de gestion des actifs a été très performante à cet égard, en vendant des créances non performantes acquises auprès d'institutions financières, et elle devrait continuer de le faire.
Quelle devrait être l'orientation de la politique budgétaire ?
Compte tenu de la progression importante de la dette publique qui résultera vraisemblablement du financement par l'État de la restructuration du secteur financier, le maintien d'une politique budgétaire saine est plus important que jamais. La Corée a réalisé des progrès inattendus à cet égard en 2000, avec un excédent sans précédent du budget consolidé de l'administration centrale, trois avant l'objectif prévu dans le plan à moyen terme d'une élimination du déficit. Celui-ci avait atteint plus de 4 pour cent du PIB en 1998, du fait de l'accroissement des dépenses réalisées pour faire face au chiffre record du chômage et de la diminution des recettes fiscales, avant de revenir à moins de 3 pour cent en 1999. En 2000, il était prévu initialement que le déficit se situerait à 3½ pour cent du PIB, mais une forte hausse des recettes fiscales et des dépenses inférieures à celles escomptées - à hauteur de 10 400 milliards de won (2 pour cent du PIB - ont en fait conduit à un excédent de 1.3 pour cent. L'augmentation des recettes publiques, qui ont dépassé de 14 pour cent le niveau prévu (3 pour cent du PIB), a été due essentiellement à un doublement des recettes au titre de l'impôt sur les sociétés et à certaines réformes du régime d'imposition. Globalement, les améliorations apportées au système fiscal étaient conformes aux recommandations de l'Étude économique 2000, notamment la réforme de l'imposition du revenu à la retraite, la simplification de l'impôt sur les sociétés et l'élimination de certains impôts affectés. Cependant, de nouvelles mesures sont requises pour élargir la base de l'impôt sur le revenu des personnes physiques et de la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée et pour améliorer l'imposition du revenu du capital et du patrimoine.
La structure compliquée du budget de l'État de la Corée, qui comprend un compte général et 23 comptes spéciaux faisant l'objet d'une approbation législative, plus 43 comptes publics, qui exigent simplement l'approbation du cabinet et donnent au ministère de tutelle une marge de manœuvre considérable, présente plusieurs inconvénients. Premièrement, elle complique les prévisions de dépenses. Les dépenses sur une base consolidée ne sont pas connues lorsque le budget est adopté, ce qui réduit la transparence et rend difficile le contrôle de la politique budgétaire. Deuxièmement, le recours à des fonds publics tend à estomper la distinction entre secteur public et secteur privé. Troisièmement, le cloisonnement des dépenses réduit l'efficience allocative en faisant obstacle aux transferts de fonds vers les utilisations les plus productives. Il importe donc que les autorités mènent à bien leur plan visant à intégrer tous les fonds publics - ainsi que les fonds extrabudgétaires qui ne sont même pas inclus dans le budget consolidé - dans le budget soumis à l'Assemblée nationale pour approbation. En outre, la " Loi de responsabilité budgétaire " actuellement en cours d'examen devrait être approuvée. Cette loi exigerait de l'État qu'il établisse un plan budgétaire triennal sur une base annuelle et interdirait les rallonges budgétaires sauf en cas de crise. En outre, toute proposition d'augmentation des dépenses ou de réduction des recettes devrait être accompagnée d'un plan visant à en compenser l'incidence sur le budget. Le projet de loi exige aussi que soient fournies dans le budget des informations sur les engagements conditionnels et les activités quasi budgétaires, comme les garanties offertes par l'État pour les prêts et obligations du secteur privé. Outre les préoccupations de transparence et d'efficience notées plus haut, il manque aussi dans le cadre budgétaire une mesure du solde des administrations publiques, qui devrait être au centre du plan budgétaire à moyen terme.
L'apparition d'un excédent budgétaire en 2000 ménage certaines possibilités de fonctionnement des stabilisateurs automatiques si la reprise économique ne se matérialise pas en 2001. Malgré tout, il importe de prendre des mesures pour éliminer les distorsions qui affectent encore le système fiscal et pour améliorer l'efficience allocative des dépenses, vu le coût d'une plus large coopération économique avec la Corée du Nord et du vieillissement de la population, thème spécial de l'Étude économique de cette année. La transition démographique en cours aura indéniablement de profondes répercussions sur les dépenses publiques. Le phénomène de vieillissement est relativement tardif en Corée, mais son rythme est l'un des plus rapides de la zone de l'OCDE. De fait, le taux de dépendance des personnes âgées, qui n'est inférieur que dans deux autres pays de l'OCDE, devrait passer au sixième rang des pays de l'OCDE en 2050. En effet, le taux de natalité a fortement baissé - de plus de cinq dans les années 50 à 1.5 durant la deuxième moitié des années 90 - et la Corée a connu la plus forte augmentation de l'espérance de vie dans la zone de l'OCDE au cours de cette période. La rapidité de la transition démographique créera d'autant plus de problèmes que le système de protection sociale n'est pas bien développé et que le schéma traditionnel de prise en charge des parents âgés par leurs enfants tend à s'affaiblir. Les personnes âgées ont une deuxième source de revenu, l'allocation de retraite versée aux salariés, qui ne couvre cependant que 17 pour cent de la population active et est en fait une indemnité de départ. Compte tenu des sources traditionnelles de complément de revenu et d'une longévité relativement faible jusqu'à présent, se préparer à la retraite est une idée assez nouvelle en Corée.
Quelles réformes sont nécessaires pour améliorer le système de prestations sociales pour les personnes agées ?
Pour compléter les sources privées d'aide aux personnes âgées, le gouvernement a créé en 1988 le Régime national de retraite. Toutefois, le système public de retraite actuellement en place, qui comporte également des régimes professionnels pour les fonctionnaires, les militaires et les enseignants du secteur privé, est entaché d'un certain nombre de déficiences. Premièrement, on prévoit que le taux de cotisation au Régime public de retraite devra passer de 9 pour cent actuellement à plus de 17 pour cent durant les quelques prochaines décennies pour qu'une retraite égale à 60 pour cent du salaire moyen sur l'ensemble de la carrière puisse être servie au travailleur à revenu moyen ayant cotisé quarante ans. En conséquence, les dépenses publiques pour les retraites augmenteront de 8 points de PIB, l'une des hausses prévisibles les plus fortes dans les pays de l'OCDE. Si l'on y ajoute l'allocation de retraite, le coût des pensions dépassera un quart de la masse salariale, ce qui aura probablement des effets négatifs sur le marché du travail et sur la croissance potentielle. De plus, cela fera peser une lourde charge sur la jeune génération d'aujourd'hui, qui pourrait aussi avoir à supporter le coût de l'unification nationale. Deuxièmement, moins de la moitié de la population active a contribué au Régime national de retraite en 1999, le taux de participation étant faible pour les travailleurs indépendants. Ces derniers sous-déclarent en outre sensiblement leurs revenus. La forte hausse du taux de cotisation nécessaire pour assurer la viabilité du Régime national de retraite est de nature à décourager une plus large participation. Troisièmement, les taux globaux de remplacement sont élevés, puisqu'ils proches de 90 pour cent pour les salariés bénéficiant de l'allocation de retraite. Quatrièmement, la déconnexion du Régime national de retraite et des régimes professionnels freine la mobilité du travail. Cinquièmement, la concentration des actifs au sein du Régime national de retraite crée un risque, puisque ces actifs d'après estimations certaines pourraient augmenter pour atteindre près de 50 pour cent du PIB, sur la base des taux de cotisation actuellement en vigueur.
La Corée a la possiblité de remédier à ces faiblesses en réformant profondément le système actuel, puisque le Régime national de retraite ne commencera à servir des pensions à taux plein qu'en 2008. Certes, le gouvernement est confronté à de nombreux problèmes très délicats de restructuration, mais c'est maintenant qu'il faut s'attaquer à la réforme de retraites, qui sera de plus en plus difficile à mettre en œuvre à mesure que le système arrivera à maturité. Pour cette réforme, il faudrait s'efforcer d'accroître le rôle de l'épargne privée pour la retraite et d'élargir la couverture du régime. De plus, il faudrait limiter le taux de cotisation à environ 15 pour cent, comme l'a préconisé la Commission coréenne de réforme des retraites.
Pour ce faire, on pourrait mettre en place un système à trois piliers.
· Le premier pilier, prenant la forme d'un régime public obligatoire, pourrait comprendre deux éléments. Premièrement, une pension de base universelle financée par l'impôt, qui permettrait de réaliser les objectifs de redistribution et de remédier au faible taux de participation. Le deuxième élément pourrait être une pension à prestation définie, calculée sous condition de revenu et actuariellement juste. Il est important que le système de protection sociale prenne correctement en charge les personnes âgées jusqu'à ce que ce système soit opérationnel. Il faudrait remédier aux déséquilibres financiers des régimes publics professionnels, qui sont déjà en déficit et introduire la transférabilité avec le Régime national. Enfin, la Caisse nationale de retraite devrait être gérée de façon à favoriser le développement du marché des capitaux à long terme en Corée.
· Le deuxième pilier pourrait résulter de la conversion de l'allocation de retraite en une pension obligatoire versée par l'entreprise dans le cadre d'un régime à cotisation définie entièrement capitalisé. L'allocation de retraite, créée pour jouer le double rôle d'une assurance sociale et d'un régime public de retraite, n'a plus d'utilité aujourd'hui. En outre, il n'y a aucune obligation de placer à l'extérieur de l'entreprise les fonds qui sont mis de côté pour cette allocation, ce qui la rend très tributaire de la solidité financière de l'entreprise. Il serait bénéfique pour les travailleurs que l'allocation actuelle de retraite, qui n'est pas actuellement préfinancée, soit remplacée par une source plus sûre de revenu pour la retraite. Il faudrait que la pension d'entreprise soit transférable pour favoriser la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre et permettre la participation des travailleurs indépendants.
· Le troisième pilier serait un système plus efficace de comptes individuels de retraite.
La santé et la prise en charge de longue durée sont deux autres domaines où les dépenses publiques devraient augmenter au fur et à mesure du vieillissement de la population. Récemment, la Corée a modifié résolument certains éléments de son système de santé, notamment en dissociant la prescription des médicaments et leur vente et en unifiant en un dispositif national les diverses assurances maladie. On est encore dans l'incertitude quant à l'effet de ces réformes. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut veiller à l'efficience du système actuel pour limiter l'impact du vieillissement sur les dépenses. Plusieurs options pourraient être envisagées, en particulier le préfinancement des dépenses médicales et de la prise en charge de longue durée, principalement supportée jusqu'à présent par les familles. En outre, les femmes étant de plus en plus nombreuses à travailler et les familles ayant de moins en moins d'enfants, il faudra compléter le schéma traditionnel de prise en charge des personnes âgées par un dispositif dans lequel les pouvoirs publics joueront un plus grand rôle.
Le dispositif de ciblage de l'inflation estil adapté ?
On fera face plus facilement au vieillissement ainsi qu'à la restructuration des entreprises et du secteur financier si l'on prend des mesures qui favorisent la croissance à long terme. La stabilité des prix est fondamentale à cet égard. Il est indispensable d'assurer la crédibilité du nouveau dispositif de ciblage de l'inflation mis en place en 1998. Dès cette époque, la Banque de Corée s'est vu conférer l'indépendance nécessaire à la responsabilité de la réalisation de cet objectif. En 1999 et en 2000, l'inflation a été inférieure à l'objectif central, fixé respectivement à 3 et 2.5 pour cent, l'appréciation du won ayant contribué à limiter la hausse des prix. En 2001, l'objectif central a été relevé de ½ point et porté à 3 pour cent 1 point. L'indicateur retenu pour l'objectif d'inflation - l'indice de base des prix à la consommation - ayant monté de 4.3 pour cent en glissement annuel au cours des quatre premiers mois de 2001, l'inflation pour l'année devrait se situer vers le haut de la fourchette.
La Banque de Corée a également adopté une politique fondée sur les taux d'intérêt au lieu d'un ciblage des agrégats monétaires, bien que l'impact des variations des taux à court terme soit particulièrement incertain à l'heure actuelle et probablement quelque peu limité dans le contexte d'une profonde restructuration du secteur financier. Depuis 1998, le taux au jour le jour oscille dans une fourchette de 25 points de base autour de 5 pour cent, la mesure la plus récente étant une baisse de 25 points de base en juillet 2001. Le niveau actuel de 4.75 pour cent signifie que le taux réel à court terme se situe à un point bas historique inférieur à 1 pour cent. La demande demeurant faible, il serait prématuré au stade actuel de relever les taux d'intérêt. Toutefois, dès que la reprise sera fermement établie, il faudrait que la Banque de Corée relève rapidement les taux d'intérêt pour faire la preuve de son attachement à l'objectif d'inflation à moyen terme de 2.5 pour cent. Étant donné les décalages longs et variables qui caractérisent la politique monétaire, il est vain de fixer un objectif annuel d'inflation, surtout dans le cadre d'une politique fondée sur les taux d'intérêt. Enfin, le système des " prêts sous plafond global " accordés aux banques en fonction de leurs concours aux petites et moyennes entreprises ne semble pas conforme à l'adoption d'une politique de taux d'intérêt.
Le taux de change joue un plus grand rôle dans la politique monétaire depuis la libération des opérations en capital et la mise en place d'un flottement du taux de change en 1998. Vu la baisse rapide du won au début de 2001, il semblerait que la Banque de Corée soit intervenu sur le marché des changes afin d'éviter une hausse ou une baisse excessive de la monnaie. Il faut certes suivre de près le taux de change, vu son influence sur l'évolution des prix, mais une intervention stérilisée sur le marché des changes n'aura généralement qu'une efficacité limitée dans la plupart des cas. Le flottement du taux de change reste la meilleure solution, en incitant les entreprises et les institutions financières à prendre en compte le risque de change.
Quelle politiques sont nécessaires pour encourager la concurrence ?
En plus d'une faible inflation, des mesures visant à intensifier la concurrence amélioreraient le potentiel de forte croissance de la Corée. La Commission coréenne de la concurrence et la Commission de réforme de la réglementation ont engagé une action pour intensifier la concurrence et réformer la réglementation dans certains secteurs. Il est essentiel que les actionnaires et les institutions financières veillent de plus près aux activités intra-groupe. De plus amples progrès dans ces domaines devraient permettre un assouplissement des réglementations applicables aux chaebols. La Commission coréenne de la concurrence devrait en outre pouvoir ainsi consacrer davantage de ressources aux problèmes traditionnels de politique de la concurrence. Il est également crucial de maintenir le rythme de l'action que la Commission de la réforme de la réglementation mène pour l'élimination des textes qui limitent la concurrence et l'évaluation des projets de réglementation. La publication des analyses d'impact de la réglementation, exigées pour les projets de réglementation, conforterait le processus de réforme. Il faudrait en outre harmoniser pleinement les normes coréennes avec les normes internationales, pour que la normalisation ne constitue pas un obstacle à l'importation. La tendance à la réduction et à la rationalisation des mesures de protection et des aides aux petites et moyennes entreprises est salutaire. Il faudrait poursuivre dans cette voie. Il faut en outre veiller à la mobilité des travailleurs, indispensable pour les restructurations, tout en assurant un filet de protection sociale adéquat. Les restructurations sont d'autant plus difficiles que 11 pour cent seulement des chômeurs sont indemnisés. Le nouveau dispositif de protection sociale mis en place l'an dernier devrait en outre bénéficier à tous ceux qui remplissent les conditions requises et une aide suffisante devrait être fournie pour que le niveau de revenu soit au moins égal au coût de la vie minimum.
Les mesures en faveur de la concurrence se sont doublées de réformes dans certains secteurs clés. Toutefois, le plan décennal engagé en 1999 pour faire jouer la concurrence dans le secteur de l'électricité est en retard sur son calendrier. L'exécution de ce plan, qui consiste à séparer et à privatiser les installations de production et de distribution d'électricité à capitaux publics, serait très bénéfique pour les consommateurs. Dans le secteur des télécommunications, il faudrait que le gouvernement s'en tienne également à son plan de privatisation intégrale de Korea Telecom d'ici à juin 2002. Cette mesure, s'accompagnant d'une moindre intervention des pouvoirs publics dans ce secteur et de la mise en place d'une autorité indépendante de régulation, renforcerait la concurrence. Dans l'agriculture, le gouvernement diminue le soutien des prix tout en augmentant les paiements directs aux agriculteurs, comme convenu lors du cycle d'Uruguay. L'objectif ultime devrait être néanmoins d'accroître l'efficience du secteur agricole, en partie en augmentant la superficie des exploitations.
Pour plus d'informations - Des informations complémentaires sur cette Étude peuvent être obtenues auprès de Randall Jones, Tél. : 33 (0) 145 24 79 28 (email : Randall.Jones@oecd.org). - Source : OCDE Juillet 2001
FMI - OCDE SEOUL DEVRAIT ACCELERER LES RESTRUCTURATIONS
La croissance de l'économie coréenne pourrait atteindre 5,5 % l'année prochaine
Afin de permettre à l'économie coréenne de se redresser et de conserver la confiance des marchés, le gouvernement devrait s'employer à remédier rapidement aux faiblesses que continuent d'accuser les secteurs des entreprises et de la finance, ont estimé le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) et l'Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) dans leurs rapports respectifs le 2 août dernier.
Les deux organisations internationales ont noté que d'une part, les grandes entreprises toujours aux prises avec les difficultés financières et, d'autre part, les petites sociétés qui n'ont que peu de chance de survivre représentaient un poids important pour l'économie coréenne. En conséquence, elles ont recommandé au gouvernement coréen de prendre une série de mesures énergiques afin de régler leur cas.
Dans un rapport faisant brièvement le point des discussions qu'il a tenues avec le gouvernement coréen au mois de mai dernier dans le cadre du programme de contrôle mis en place à l'achèvement du plan, le FMI l'a mis en garde contre le fait que le recours à des mesures provisoires pour résoudre les problèmes du secteur des entreprises ne ferait qu'aggraver la situation et augmenter les coûts à l'avenir. Dans ce contexte, le FMI s'est félicité de la décision prise par le gouvernement de Séoul de mettre fin à l'application du "plan rapide de refinancement des obligations émises par les entreprises privées", qui était financé par la Korea Development Bank, un établissement géré par l'Etat.
De même, l'OCDE a exhorté le gouvernement d'arrêter progressivement la mise en ©"uvre de ce programme dès que possible, insistant sur le fait que cette mesure ne devrait s'appliquer qu'aux entreprises qui se sont engagées sur la voie d'une véritable restructuration. Le plan de refinancement des obligations, a indiqué l'OCDE, pourrait affaiblir la portée des campagnes de réforme menées par le marché, et créer des obstacles d'ordre moral pour les entreprises.
Dans son rapport annuel portant sur la Corée, l'OCDE, tout en appelant le gouvernement coréen à suspendre son plan de sauvetage destiné aux entreprises en cessation de paiement, lui a recommandé de se défaire de la part qu'il détient dans le capital des banques commerciales, dans un délai plus rapide que ce qui avait été initialement prévu, exprimant la crainte que les banques gérées par l'Etat n'appliquent leur propre programme de restructuration.
Le FMI s'est empressé de reprendre le point de vue avancé par l'OCDE, demandant au gouvernement de promouvoir la cession de la Seoul Bank, conformément à ce qui avait été prévu, et d'accélérer la privatisation des autres établissements bancaires. Si l'on en croit les responsables du Fonds, le fait que le gouvernement ait assumé, vis-à-vis des institutions financières, les rôles de propriétaire, de superviseur et de garant de la dette des entreprises, aurait pour effet de retarder la restructuration et d'empêcher le développement sain d'un réseau de banques commerciales et d'un marché de capitaux.
Concernant la question de la gestion macroéconomique, le FMI a approuvé la récente décision prise par la banque centrale de réduire le taux d'intérêt à court terme au jour le jour, ajoutant qu'il soutiendrait de nouvelles baisses en cas de nécessité.
En outre, le FMI a souligné l'importance pour le gouvernement, compte tenu de l'ampleur du ralentissement économique, de ne pas dépasser le seuil des dépenses budgétaires prévu pour cette année et ainsi d'atteindre l'objectif révisé de déficit budgétaire.
Pour sa part, l'OCDE a estimé que l'économie coréenne devrait confirmer ses prévisions de croissance du produit intérieur brut établies au mois de mai dernier pour 2001 et 2002, respectivement à 4,2 % et à 5,5 %.
En dépit d'un fort repli de la croissance de l'économie coréenne, le rapport publié par l'OCDE a noté un certain nombre de signes laissant entendre que "la baisse pourrait être passagère". Toutefois, la reprise annoncée pour 2001 et 2002 est basée sur l'hypothèse d'une stabilisation du taux de change du won par rapport au dollar, et sur celle d'une augmentation des exportations du pays à la suite d'un redressement de l'économie américaine d'ici à la fin de cette année, précise le rapport.
Par ailleurs, les deux organisations internationales ont appelé le gouvernement coréen à améliorer sa réglementation relative aux faillites des entreprises, ainsi que son régime de retraite.
En particulier, le FMI a indiqué que l'inefficacité des procédures de faillite allongeait les délais de signature d'accords portant sur des programmes de règlement des dettes ou retardait les formalités de cession des actifs. L'organisation financière a ainsi mis en avant l'importance de renforcer la législation relative aux faillites des entreprises, et notamment celle de consolider les droits des grands établissements créditeurs, en vertu de la Loi sur la réorganisation des sociétés.
Dans le même temps, l'OCDE a recommandé au gouvernement d'adopter un système de retraite à trois piliers, en vue de préparer le pays au vieillissement de la société. Elle note que la Corée se verrait attribuer la sixième place parmi les pays membres de l'organisation pour ce qui est du ratio de dépendance des personnes âgées - qui correspond au pourcentage de personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans par rapport à la population en âge d'exercer un emploi.
Le premier pilier du plan mis au point par l'OCDE est un régime de retraite obligatoire, qui comprend un système de protection sociale visant à redistribuer les revenus, et un plan de retraite à taux de cotisation déterminés en fonction des niveaux de revenu. Le deuxième pilier consisterait à transformer l'actuel système d'allocations de retraite légales en un régime obligatoire de caisses d'entreprise à taux de cotisation déterminés, tandis que le troisième pilier reviendrait à mettre en place un système de retraite privé.
L'OCDE a ajouté qu'à l'instar des fonds publics, les capitaux destinés à un usage public devraient être inclus dans le budget du gouvernement, ce qui signifie que l'allocation de ces fonds nécessiterait l'approbation de l'Assemblée nationale.
Park Sang-soo Source : Le Courrier de la Corée 2001.08.14 (Note du webmestre: article paru avant la tragédie du 11 septembre)
LA COREE SOUFFRE DE SES DEPENDANCES
La Banque de Corée vient d'annoncer une croissance du produit intérieur brut (PIB) sud-coréen de 2,7 % pour le deuxième trimestre, soit près d'un point et demi en deçà des attentes formulées par le gouvernement il y a moins d'un mois. Par rapport au premier trimestre, la progression du PIB se limite à 0,5 %, après le 0,3 % enregistré lors du premier trimestre.
Contrairement au reste de la région, cette méforme n'est pourtant pas due à l'expansion incontrôlée de la Chine. Bien au contraire. La Corée du Sud profite de son savoir-faire technologique pour aller titiller son encombrant voisin sur son territoire. Ainsi, l'année dernière, la balance commerciale a largement été à l'avantage de Séoul : 18,455 milliards de dollars (20,211 milliards d'euros) d'exportations contre 12,799 milliards de dollars (14,017 milliards d'euros) d'importations de produits chinois. Cet écart, stable depuis quelques années, ne devrait pas diminuer dans les années à venir.
Tout d'abord, les entreprises de télécommunications coréennes, parmi lesquelles Korea Telecom et SK Telecom, ont remporté d'importants contrats pour le développement du réseau Internet chinois et pour l'installation de la nouvelle norme de téléphone portable CDMA. Ensuite, les autorités coréennes ont prévu que leur économie sera l'une de celles qui profiteront le plus de la victoire de Pékin dans la course à l'organisation aux jeux Olympiques de 2008.
La faiblesse de la Corée du Sud trouve en fait ses origines dans sa dépendance vis-à-vis des économies japonaise et surtout américaine. En effet, ces deux pays comptaient encore récemment pour 31,6 % de ses exportations et 40,98 % de ses importations. Leur mauvaise santé actuelle s'en ressent donc très durement à Séoul. La seconde explication réside dans les difficultés rencontrées par le gouvernement pour se soulager du poids des entreprises en graves difficultés financières. Aux premières loges, Daewoo Motor, dont les discussions pour son rachat entre ses créditeurs et General Motors traînent en longueur, et Hynix Semiconductors, ex-Hyundai Electronics, que gouvernement et créditeurs refusent toujours de laisser tomber, après l'injection de plus de 5.100 milliards de wons (4,34 milliards d'euros). Les difficultés de cette dernière rentrent d'autant plus en compte que les revenus du secteur des semi-conducteurs tiennent normalement une part non négligeable dans les résultats économique du pays. Tristan De Bourbon, à Séoul Source : La Tribune - 22/8/2001
SOUTH KOREA'S GROWTH SLOWS
South Korea has become the latest Asian economy to suffer from the global contraction in markets for its high-tech exports.
Growth slowed to 2.7% in the three months to June, down from 3.7% growth in the first quarter of the year, and well below the official Bank of Korea forecast of 3.3%. The central bank greeted the figures as better than other Asian nations and "a positive sign that chances are slight that the nation's economy will see a steep downturn". Finance minister Jin Nyum said the government hoped to wrap up two crucial restructuring deals soon, as part of plans to reform unprofitable companies.
Asset sales move ahead
He said the government had agreed the sale of Hyundai Group's financial services businesses to American insurance giant AIG. "Negotations with AIG have been completed and the results can be announced anytime from today," the finance minister said on Monday. He did not say how much AIG would pay for Hyundai Investment Trust and Hyundai Securities Co. Mr Jin also said the government would step in to conclude the sale of Daewoo Motor if a deal was not forthcoming by the end of September. Creditors have been negotiating a sale of Korea's third-ranked car maker with US giant GM and partner Fiat of Italy for the past year.
Reform pays off
Analysts said painful corporate restructuring has helped South Korea's economy to perform better than other high-tech exporters such as Taiwan and Singapore, which are both in recession. "The lower-than-expected growth reflects steep falls in exports of semiconductors in June as well as sluggish corporate investment," said Chung Jung-Ho, director general of the Bank of Korea. Private spending also helped buffer the Korean economy, contributing 54.3% to GDP growth. In contrast, the manufacturing growth rate slowed to 2.2%, down from 16.9% in the second quarter of 2000.
Signs of improvement
The Bank of Korea forecast that growth will continue to slow in the third quarter of this year but will pick up from the fourth quarter as the impact of interest rate cuts and other expansionary policies are felt. The central bank has cut interest rates three times this year - pushing rates down to 4.5% - in an attempt to boost the economy.
Source : BBC News - Tuesday, 21 August, 2001
HIGH DEPENDENCY ON KEY PRODUCTS HURTING
KOREA'S EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Export has been rapidly falling in 2001, and is one of the main reasons for the instability of the Korean economy. Indeed, export in July showed its biggest decline since January of 1967 to record $11.57 billion, down 20 percent year-on-year. Taking a close look at the situation, while it is generally known that the deep drop in semiconductor exports has led the nation's overall export decline, other major export products are also showing poor performances compared to the same period last year.
In fact, one of the fundamental problems faced by the nation is that its export performance is highly dependent upon a few major products, notably IT-related products such as semiconductors. Therefore, the entire nation's export figures will be seriously damaged if the current recession in global IT-related industries is prolonged and export of these products remains stagnant. Another fundamental problem is that the nation possesses few "world best products" that can weather the ups and downs of global demand through their market-dominating power. As a result, the market shares of domestic products are rapidly being taken over by competitors such as the Chinese.
The bottom line is that only countries with world best products can survive and profit, given this increasingly fierce competition in the world marketplace. Accordingly, now is the time for domestic companies and the government to think over ways to increase the number of domestic products that can successfully compete and win in the world market. An examination of the following cases of successful Korean world best products may be appropriate as part of this process.
Korea's 'world best' products
In order to better understand how domestic products can successfully achieve dominant positions in the global market, Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) selected ten domestic products that currently dominate the global market in terms of sales, quality and technology level. Among all the items that are occupying top market shares in the world market, products that possess the highest market position and quality were selected, with some of the products not necessarily being manufactured goods, and some being chosen for their display of Korean originality. However, many products that hold top global rankings, but have limited markets and low export volume, were excluded from the selection process.
Six products were chosen first for their number one market position and high technological quality. They include five IT-related products (DRAM chips, TFT-LCDs, CDMA-based mobile phones, set-top boxes, high-speed Internet service provision) and one traditional manufacturing product (LNG carriers). Next, two other traditional manufacturing products, that have supported the nation's export effort with once-potent competitiveness, were selected (cold steel and polyester fiber). Finally, products that have contributed to Korea's global name recognition (women's golf and ginseng) were added. It should be noted that of the selected products, while IT-related products, LNG carriers and women's golf continue to maintain top global rankings, cold steel plates, polyester fiber and ginseng are facing growing difficulties.
1.DRAM chips
Korean DRAM chips have been ranked first in the global DRAM chip market since 1998, beating out Japan. Domestic chipmakers now possess the world's leading technology. The success is ascribed to domestic makers' strategic decision to develop DRAM, among other memory products. Another factor in the success was the entrepreneurial spirit shown by domestic makers in making drastic decisions concerning investment in a timely manner.
2.TFT-LCDs
Similarly, Korean TFT-LCDs have also held a dominant position in the global market since 1998. Domestic companies' forte in this area is mainly due to application of know-how gained from their semiconductor production to the manufacturing of TFT-LCDs, thereby contributing to reduced production costs and quality improvement.
3. CDMA-based mobile phones
Korea's CDMA-based mobile phones now account for 53.7 percent of the entire global market and set the international standard for CDMA-based telecom these days, due to the nation's success in commercializing the technology before other countries. An important reason for the success was the audacity of the joint R&D efforts of the Electronics & Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), a state-owned research institute, and of corporate research centers, which ventured into a technological area that had highly questionable practicality at that time.
4. Set-top boxes
Making headlines in the dawning era of digital broadcasting, Korean made set-top boxes hold the top ranking in the global market, showing especially strong growth in the global digital set-top box market. The success was made possible through accurate forecasts of the growth of the future market and the cultivation of related technologies.
5. High-speed Internet Access service
Since its introduction three years ago, the high-speed Internet services sector has grown rapidly. For instance, 9.2 percent of Korean households used the service in 2000, the highest rate in the world. And now the operational skills of domestic service providers are considered the highest in the world. Consequently, many visitors from foreign service providers, including Japan, are visiting those domestic companies to gain operating know-how. The impressive growth is ascribable to the fierce domestic competition among Internet service providers and strong domestic demand.
6. LNG carriers
Providing another example of worldwide dominance, Korea currently ranks first in the amount of new LNG carrier construction orders received in the global market with 64 percent of total orders. Such dominance can be laid at the feet of the government's selection of LNG as a major energy source in Korea. After the selection, domestic LNG suppliers placed large quantity orders of LNG carriers with the domestic shipbuilding industry. This catapulted domestic shipbuilders into the LNG carrier construction business. Three domestic shipbuilding companies in particular, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, invested heavily in LNG carriers early on, and Korea eventually succeeded in occupying the number one spot in the global market.
7. Cold steel plates
Also impressive, Korean-manufactured cold steel plates rank first in the world in cost competitiveness, and fourth in production volume. Such success is due to continued expansion of production capacity and streamlining of production facilities. However, overcapacity problems and labor disputes within the industry exist, and may become factors blocking the products from holding a dominant position in the future.
8. Polyester fiber
Worldwide, Korean-made polyester fiber ranks first in terms of export volume, and third in terms of production. Its success is largely attributable to the growth of related industries such as textiles and petrochemicals. However, the domestic polyester industry has recently been facing difficulties caused by higher production costs and the emergence of strong foreign competitors. Other unfavorable factors include capacity problems and labor disputes within the industry.
9. Women's golf
Korean women lead international women's golf, accounting for 15 percent of the number of competitions won. Korean golfer Se-ri Pak is one of the top 3 female golfers on the LPGA tour in the U.S.
10. Ginseng
Last but not least, Ginseng has a 1000-year history in Korea, and is a herbal health product in which Korea has quality competitiveness. However, processing technology and export marketing remain as weak points for the industry.
Nurturing "gold-collar" workers
Domestic companies must take the lead, to build "world best products" aimed at the global marketplace.
For this purpose, the most important step is the nurturing of "so-called "gold-collar workers" with high levels of specialized capability. Accordingly, the application of market principles to the domestic college education system, including encouraging the advancement of renowned foreign universities in Korea, will be helpful.
Next, domestic companies must bear in mind that knowledge, technology and financial support have to be combined in order to make a world best product. Consequently, they should pool their efforts in the creation of an R&D environment similar to that of Silicon Valley in the U.S., and Technopolice and Science Park in Europe.
In addition to these corporate efforts, the government is also required to take a role in the creation of world best products. Specifically, overly restrictive government regulations need to be eased. The government's corporate policies should be transformed from regulation-oriented ones into growth- and market-oriented ones. In particular, it has to establish regulations focusing on strengthening entrepreneurship.
More generally, the government should also make the country itself a global brand. In this context, high-ranking officials, including the president, need to be "sales people" and lead the nation's investor relations (IR) efforts to create a high quality image for the nation. Source by: Korea Herald (2001.08.27)
CHINA RISES AS SECOND BIGGEST EXPORT MART
China will likely replace Japan as the second largest export destination for Korea after the United States, bringing about the first major shift in the country's trade structure, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) said yesterday.
According to official trade records, as of the end of July, Korea's exports to China totaled $10.69 billion, a 4.7 percent increase from the same period last year, while exports to Japan fell by 9.2 percent to $10.37 billion.
July was clearly the turning point, the ministry said, as exports to the two countries were very close at the end of June. First half exports to China totaled $9.162 billion and Japan $9.158 billion, with each accounting for 11.6 percent of total trade.
But in July there was a $300 million gap in export volume between the two destinations, with China's share in total exports at 11.9 percent and Japan's at 11.5 percent.
While some point out that if Korea counts all the indirect exports to China through Hong Kong, China long ago beat Japan as the second largest export partner, this is the first time that China took the second slot based on official trade records, MOCIE said.
Looking at each country separately, China wasn't even one of Korea's top 10 export markets in 1990. Then the two countries signed the diplomatic cooperation agreement in 1992 and exports to China ballooned to $2.65 billion that year, 164.7 percent higher than 1991.
In 1992, exports to Japan totaled $11.59 billion, four times that of China.
But from that point on, exports to China rose steadily every year, with $9.14 billion in 1995, $11.37 billion in 1996, $13.57 in 1997, $11.94 billion in 1998, $13.68 in 1999 and $18.45 billion last year.
By contrast, exports to Japan, which has been Korea's second largest export destination since the 1970s, have been less spectacular. Exports to the market in 1995 totaled $17.04 billion, which fell to $15.76 billion in 1996, $14.77 billion in 1997, $12.23 billion in 1998, $15.86 billion in 1999 and then rose again to $20.46 billion last year.
"We believe the shift has occurred because IT exports to Japan have been weak due to the general slowdown in the industry," a MOCIE official said. "But considering that China will join the World Trade Organization this year and host the 2008 Olympics, it's more than likely that the country will remain in the second post," he said.
The ministry predicted last month that boosted by China's hosting of the Olympic event, trade between China and Korea will reach about $100 billion by 2008.
Imports, in particular, will grow to about $56.5 billion by 2008 as China records steady economic growth of about 8 percent, the ministry said.
Currently, Korea's five biggest export products to China are organo-metallic compound, electrical products, petroleum products, textiles and steel products.
Electrical products, however, are expected to be the key export item to China as it prepares for the Olympic Games. Particularly promising electrical export items, according to the ministry, are digital home appliances like digital televisions, PDPs (plasma display panels), DVD players, broadcasting equipment and PCs.
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.08.31)
EXPORTS NOT SUFFERING FROM U.S. CRISIS: MINISTER
Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy Chang Che-shik asserted yesterday that Korea's exports are not suffering as much as it is being reported in the media during coverage of the U.S. terrorist crisis' impact on Korea.
"There is no need to worry for Korean exports because any damage is just a momentary lapse due to problems mostly in shipping," the minister said at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Korean Business Women Federation (KBWF) at Hotel Shilla yesterday.
He said, "There are reports that Korea suffered about $33 million worth of damage in exports, but most of these are caused by delays in shipping because the U.S. airports were closed for a few days. But these problems will be taken care of soon and we expect exports to resume with no further damage down the road."
In arguing for the safe state of the Korean economy, the minister further pointed out that the U.S. recorded 0.2 percent GDP growth at the end of first half, Japan saw -0.8 percent and Taiwan -2.4 percent as a result of the ongoing global recession.
"But Korea posted a very competitive 2.7 percent growth during the first half, which shows it is doing a lot better than some of the other countries," he said. "Given such facts, it is wrong to keep on interpreting the economy negatively all the time," Chang said.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, the ministry pointed out that exports to the United States are being delayed due to shipping, customs and payment problems.
The department put the total losses at $33 million, taking into account that products were being withheld as the airports and harbors were closed and the customs headquarters and the maritime and port authority office collapsed with the World Trade Center.
Other economic sources are offering differing opinions from Chang, though. The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Corp. (KOTRA), for one, recently pointed out that Korea could suffer more losses if the United States goes to war with some of the Middle Eastern countries, as trade with the region makes up about 10 percent of total trade, with exports alone coming to about $7.6 billion, or 4.4 percent of Korea's total exports.
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.09.20)
KOREA RISES AS 3RD LARGEST FDI MARKET IN ASIA
Korea beat Japan last year to become the third largest foreign direct investment (FDI) market in Asia, according to a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD).
Released through the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) yesterday, the UNCTD's "World Investment Report 2001," which cumulated FDI trends for 194 countries, showed that Korea's FDI total last year reached $10.2 billion, placing it third in the Asian Pacific region.
Hong Kong ranked at the top with $64.5 billion followed by China with $40.8 billion. Japan, which had held the third slot for a number of years, fell behind Korea with $8.2 billion.
In 1999, the ranking order for FDI was China at the top with $40.3 billion, followed by Hong Kong with $24.6 billion, Japan $12.7 billion, Korea $10.6 billion and Singapore $7.2 billion.
FDI in Asia as a whole rose by 44 percent between 1999 and 2000 to $143 billion, compared to the $1.27 trillion for the entire world, an 18.2 percent increase from 1999.
The UNCTD singled out three Asian countries in particular - Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan - calling them "countries in spotlight" as each recorded cash FDI inflows exceeding $80 billion last year.
By contrast, FDI in Southeast Asia fell drastically to make up 10 percent of total investment in Asia last year, compared to the 30 percent it boasted in the mid-1990s, the report showed.
Korea ended up with high scores in the foreign capital section as well, given that nine Korean companies were included in the list of the world's top 50 multinational companies from developing countries, second only to Hong Kong with 10 firms.
Korean multinationals on the list include Samsung Corporation (5th), Daewoo (6th), LG Electronics (7th), SK (8th) and Samsung Electronics (10th).
Broken down, investments from developed countries made up 79.1 percent of the world's total FDI last year, up slightly from 77.2 percent in 1999, but investments from developing countries shrunk from 20.7 percent in 1999 to 18.9 percent last year, the UNCTD report said.
Looking at specific amounts, developed countries (24 nations) invested a total of $1.50 trillion, developing countries (156) $240 billion and Mid and Eastern Europe (14) $25 billion, each a growth of 21.1 percent, 8.1 percent and 8.7 percent from 1999, respectively.
The share that developing countries amassed in global FDI in 1990 was 18.4 percent, which rose steadily to reach a 20.7-41.1 percent share through last year. Accordingly, last year's 18.9 percent share result is the lowest for the category of investors since 1991.
By contrast, developed countries' global investment share has been rising regularly, coming to 56.8 percent in 1997, 69.8 percent in 1998 and 77.2 percent in 1999.
By country, the United States invested the most with $281 billion, followed by Germany with $176 billion, England at $130 billion and Canada $63.3 billion last year.
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.09.19)
FOREIGN INVESTMENT ATTRACTION PROGRAM STARTS
In a move to attract foreign investment, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) has joined hands with the Korea Investment Service Center (KISC) to launch the Investment Match Marketing project.
Under the project, the ministry and the KISC will mediate between companies wanting to invest in Korea and domestic enterprises eager to bring in investment.
The ministry will compile a list of domestic companies while seeking to set up cooperative ties with leading foreign consultants.
The new project will kick off next month after signing contracts with the related foreign consulting companies, according to a MOCIE official. Source : Korea Times - 21/8/2001
FOREIGN INVESTORS FOCUS ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
When investing in stocks, foreigners relied mainly on financial statements of the listed firms in the first half of the year, examining such figures as return on assets (ROA) and gross margin ratio.
According to reports from the Korea Stock Exchange yesterday, the ratio of income to sales of the top 50 stocks mostly bought by foreign investors was 7.15 percent, higher than the ratio of 6.6 percent by institutional investors and retail investors.
ROAs of the most favored issues by foreigners stood at 6.18 percent, also higher than the 5.16 percent of institutional investors.
Meanwhile, foreigners net bought 645.5 billion won shares in listed firms, posting positive business records, while individual investors net sold 2.853 trillion won in shares remaining in the black. Source : Korea Herald 24/8/2001
GOV'T TO LOWER 'FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISTRICT' REQUIREMENT TO $50 MILLION
In a bid to attract more foreign direct investment, the government will lower the minimum investment figure for designating an area as a "foreign investment district" from the current $100 million to $50 million.
The government will also begin offering financial incentives to the foreign-invested multinational companies who hire Korean employees, as well as build new schools for foreign students.
Vice Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy Lee Hee-beom made these announcements at a meeting yesterday, held to find ways to invigorate FDI, which has been declining sharply amid the global economic slowdown.
Speaking to 16 regional foreign investment institutions, Lee said, "Due mostly to external factors, FDI has fallen by 32 percent compared to last year (last year's total was 60 billion won), we must each make an effort to increase FDI in one's own district."
In yet another major change in policy, the government will begin deciding budgets for different regions based on their FDI procurement performance.
"This is to encourage more active participation from the regional institutions, who will have their efforts rewarded directly," Lee said.
The commerce ministry will divide performance into four levels and grade each region according to past FDI records and their aggressiveness in designing campaigns.
The results of these evaluations will also be reflected in the annual awarding ceremony for those who have shown extraordinary efforts for drawing FDI, the ministry said. This year's awards will be given in November.
These are the latest efforts to increase FDI made by the local government, whose trailing figures have stirred a minor panic among economic regulators. FDI in July totaled $720 million, a sharp drop from $1.22 billion in June, and the fifth consecutive fall from the investment figures of the corresponding month last year.
Other recent government efforts include expanding designated areas for foreigners-only industrial parks in South Jeolla Province by 990,000 square meters, establishing a counseling team for multinational firms' labor relations and offering red-carpet service to major foreign investors. (mihui@koreaherald.co.kr) Source : Korea Herald - 2001.08.31
REITS REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT MADE EASY - AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEWLY INTRODUCED REITS IN KOREA
There now exist vehicles for the investment in real estate assets disposed of by corporations in the process of restructuring. The Real Estate Investment Trusts Act (hereinafter "the Act") was enacted April 7th 2001 and came into force July 1st after its first amendment May 24th. The Act has finally been implemented after a series of debates and studies over the last two years since the concept was first mooted in 1998. The major revision of May 24th allowed for the establishment of Corporate Restructuring Real Estate Investment Trusts (hereinafter "CR REITs").
The Act allows for the purchase, management and disposal of corporate real estate assets to provide a satisfactory return to investors.
Real Estate Investment Trusts (hereinafter "REITs") represent a change in the nature of real estate investment from speculation toward sound and professional management as well as a means of enhancing the liquidity of corporate assets. REITs will also aid the transparency of the real estate market by making information on transactions, earnings and risks widely available.
Real estate now accounts for 40 percent of the assets of major Korean corporations while it is commonplace for financial institutions to hold real estate as loan collateral. The rationale behind the introduction of REITs is thus to promote corporate restructuring and liquidity by aiding the disposal of burdensome and/or unproductive real estate assets in a manner which could not have been hitherto accomplished under existing practices.
However, there is skepticism in some quarters as to whether REITs will fire sufficient investor interest to live up to their expectations. Such concerns focus on the relative absence of tax incentives compared to CR REITs. For example, REITs offer no exemption of corporate tax and only a 50-percent exemption on acquisition and registration tax.
On the other hand, as "paper companies" CR REITs may reduce management costs by outsourcing. They also qualify for tax benefits including exemptions on corporate, acquisition and registration taxes as well as a 50-percent reduction on Special Value Added Tax. (See table at right). Consequently, real estate market observers project that CR REITs rather than REITs will be the big winners in attracting domestic and foreign investors.
CR REITs, too, have their drawbacks. Most often cited is the ambiguity regarding managerial responsibility, and their potential for flooding the real estate market if the disposal of a number of assets occurs simultaneously due to the fixed time limit of CR REITs under the Act.
Furthermore, there are other potential obstacles to the successful launch of REITs in the form of possible amendments to the current Housing Lease Protection Act or the Lease Protection Act as it affects non-residential buildings such as commercial complexes. Proposed by lawmakers from the ruling and opposition parties to protect low-income merchants, the amendments guarantee lease periods for three to five years without consideration of the contractual terms of a non-residential lease agreement.
This would guarantee the rights of a lessee holding a business registration to designate a given building as their place of business against a third party who later acquires a right on the building, even if their lease does not appear on the register of the building.
The amendments would also provide for lessors to compensate lessees for necessary and beneficial expenses following the termination of a lease notwithstanding clauses in the original agreement demanding that the lessee restore the building to its original state.
In order that REITs generate profits by their successful management of real estate assets in the manner intended, the flexibility of leases should be respected. However, such protection measures as guaranteeing the status of a lessee without consideration of the terms and conditions specified in a lease agreement may distort the market mechanism to the point they may depress the price of a given building.
Han Ju Kim and Young Jun Kim Dongsuh International Law Offices Tel: 02-3471-3705, Fax: 02-3471-3708 E-mail: hjkim@bizlaw.co.kr, yjkim@bizlaw.co.kr Source : KT-I juillet-août 2001
SOCIETY FACING IDEOLOGY CRISIS
By Lihm Hwa-sup
Last year's historic inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il has led to serious ideological confusion among South Koreans.
Most Koreans in their 30s or older still remember posters in their primary school classrooms which described North Korean communists as red-colored, blood-thirsty ghouls with a horn or two on their heads. They also recall teachers showing a cartoon in class that portrayed North Koreans as bloodthirsty wolves led by a small pig.
Of course, most South Koreans know the images weren't real, but negative preconceptions about North Korea continue to persist in many South Korean minds.
That was at least part of the reason some people were confused to see North Koreans looking human and affable on television last year; depicting North Korea in a remotely favorable way was an act of treason in the past.
Confusion deepened last week, following news reports that some members of the South's delegation to an inter-Korean festival for unification in Pyongyang had violated guidelines set by the South Korean government.
Around half of the 330-member delegation attended opening and closing ceremonies near a monument commemorating Kim Il-sung's unification formula despite pledges to their own government that they would not go.
Thursday editions of all major newspapers carried stories about South Koreans penning odes honoring the deceased North Korean leader Kim Il-sung during their visit to North Korean historical sites. Some were reportedly moved to tears and made a ceremonial deep bow before a wax image of Kim at a museum near Mount Myohyang.
Even more preposterous was an inscription in a visitors book at Mangyongdae, Kim's birthplace. Prof. Kang Jeong-koo allegedly wrote, "Let us realize the historical task of national unification by upholding the spirit of Mangyongdae."
Conservatives _ some of whom are still convinced North Koreans are bloodthirsty monsters _ were indignant and blamed the Kim Dae-jung government for not preventing such ``dangerous'' behavior.
This ideological schism, dubbed ``South-South discord,'' has its roots in the 1980s, when some students, liberals and nationalists, fed up with extremely distorted anti-North propaganda by military dictators, went to the other extreme and openly declared themselves supporters of Juche, North Korea's ideology advocating self-reliance.
The number of Juche followers ("Jusapa" in Korean) is thought to have increased in the 1980s and then dwindled in the 1990s, although it is hard to make reliable estimates for the underground movement.
Liberals accuse conservatives of exaggerating the number of Jusapa in South Korea for their own political gains, while conservatives contend liberals should take the issue more seriously as it is a matter of national security.
A conservative analyst estimated the Jusapa movement numbered 10,000 in 1989, while a former follower who renounced his belief in Juche after being arrested on espionage charges said the number is likely to be less than 1,000.
Having their actions and beliefs condemned as a serious anti-state offense by the National Security Law seems to make the Jusapa feel all the more that they are patriots struggling for ``the fatherland.'' (Yonhap) Source : Korea Times - 23/08/2001
VERTICAL INTEGRATION TOWARD GLOBALIZATION
By Prof Kim Sung-soo
The final phase of vertical integration envisioned by the late SK chairman Chey Jong-hyon came between 1989 and 1991, when he closed in on realizing the objective of turning SK into a conglomerate covering everything from ``petroleum to fibers.''
Chey made the proposal during the 20th anniversary celebrations of Sunkyong Textiles in 1973, and the vertical integration was facing completion as SK dedicated the massive Ulsan Complex with its nine major industrial plants, including the fourth oil refinery and the second ethylene processing facility.
With the Ulsan Complex, SK would become the first Korean company ever to achieve full vertical integration, with a presence in petroleum exploration and petrochemicals and downstream sectors like film and textiles.
The operation of such mammoth production facilities meant that not only Sunkyong but Yukong had the foundation to emerge as a world-class integrated energy and chemical company in the 21st century. Chey was then 62.
Back in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, numerous petrochemical plants were popping up across the country with even greater concentration in information and communications.
SK, for its part, set up its very own Yuktronics in New Jersey in October 1989, launched Sunkyong Information Systems in May 1990 and YC&C in October of the same year, and set up Sunkyong Telecom in April 1991 to signal its entry into information and communications.
Along with these diversification measures, SK moved into distribution through the establishment of a logistics business division within Sunkyong Ltd. and founded Sunkyong Distribution on Jan. 1, 1990.
At the same time, Chey focused on the development of new and advanced products by setting up Sunkyong Pharmaceuticals, operating a local plant of SKC America and opening SKC Japan.
Sunkyong Magnetics spread into foreign markets while Sunkyong itself won an order for the construction of a polymer plant from Eastman Kodak and a petroleum terminal in Thailand, all evidence of the business savvy of the late SK chairman.
As the vertical integration was proceeding through the final phase, Chey shifted his focus to globalization and the enhancement of the sophistication of SK services as the main innovation strategies.
Under the innovation strategy, Chey terminated businesses such as apparel and daily necessities which had lost their competitiveness, and concentrated on high value-added products, brand businesses and integrated product marketing.
Chey established an office in Moscow to capitalize on specialized markets and became the first Korean company to set up an operation in Beijing.
On the other hand, SK moved quickly to boost its marketing activities for the export of steel, fiber and petrochemical plants, while launching new brands like Caspi and Smart for targeting the local clothing market.
As for Sunkyong Ltd., Chey saw the opportunity to utilize its strength in marketing to push integrated product trading and set up ECOBAN in the United States for adopting financial engineering as part of the globalization strategy.
Eager to engage in natural resource development, SK entered into the management of a fisheries company in Sakhalin, pursued timber businesses in Guyana in South America and joined hands with POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Co.) for a cold-rolled steel project in Malaysia.
With vertical integration firmly in place, Chey's management philosophy and ideology took concrete shape, as can be seen in his publication, ``The Future Belongs to Those who Challenge,'' which he wrote in 1992 at the age of 63.
In reality, no one took Chey seriously when he foresaw full vertical integration by declaring that SK would dominate from ``petroleum to fibers'' way back in 1975, and even those within Sunkyong expressed doubt, seeing it as an over-aggressive business plan.
However, with clear vision for the future and strong conviction and determination, Chey proceeded to realize his business objectives by the early part of the 1990s.
As could be seen, Chey had the uncanny ability to see 10 years ahead, and this meant that he began shaping SK's strategy for the 21st century in the beginning of the 1990s.
This nudged Chey to make his decision to move into the information and communications industry, which would make a viable contribution to the development of the national economy.
Having made up his mind, Chey began immediately to secure the most advanced technologies and professional manpower in the United States and succeeded in winning the license as the second operator of the second mobile communications service provider in 1992.
Even though SK had to suffer the agony of having to return the license due to political considerations, Chey continued with his plan to make energy, chemicals, information and communications the core competences as a world- class enterprise.
Such determination culminated in SK winning the controlling stake in Korea Mobile Telecom, which has since been renamed SK Telecom, to strengthen the foundation to emerge as an integrated information and communications conglomerate.
As if to recognize Chey's contribution to the development of Korean industry and economy, he was elected as the 21st chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries on Feb. 12, 1993.
In his position as FKI chairman, Chey clarified his guidelines for running the organization, the largest private economic group in the country, with the most important aspect being his principles on political contributions.
He said the main priority of business people must lie in running their companies and, in emphasizing the need for separation of corporations from politics. He said businesses should provide their support within the confines of the Political Funding Act, but no unofficial, under-the-table funds should be provided.
Where the real-name financial transactions are concerned, Chey was basically in agreement with the need for more transparent financial practices, but pointed out that measures must be taken to ensure that the side effects affecting small and medium-size companies and consumers in general be minimized.
Chey also clearly opposed the artificial and forced disbandment of large conglomerates, and insisted that the rights of companies to operate freely under the market system be protected for the health of the national economy. jakenho@koreatimes.co.kr Source : Korea Times - 6/9/2001
HYUNDAI SECURITIES : BRAS DE FER ENTRE AIG ET SEOUL
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D'ICI A 2003, LES CONSOMMATEURS ASIATIQUES DOMINERONT LE WEB
Richard Werly, Tokyo
Selon une étude de la firme américaine Gartner Dataquest, l'Asie dépassera les Etats-Unis en nombre d'abonnés à Internet dès 2003, avec 183,3 millions d'internautes, contre 162,8 millions outre- Atlantique et presque autant en Europe.
L'une des raisons pour expliquer ce boom en Extrême-Orient est, Japon excepté, le faible coût des communications téléphoniques et des prix d'abonnement. Mais d'autres facteurs interviennent aussi. Le premier est la démographie. Hormis l'archipel japonais vieillissant, la plupart des pays de la zone ont des populations jeunes, avides de nouveaux horizons. Le second est la présence massive d'équipementiers électroniques qui mettent le paquet sur leurs marchés domestiques.
La vraie révolution du Net en Asie est toutefois à venir: "L'utilisation du Web au Japon et dans la région va exploser avec l'arrivée des réseaux à haut débit", affirmait en mai à Tokyo le N°2 de Sony, Kunitake Ando. Les câblo-opérateurs se lancent en effet à fond dans les services d'accès par fibre optique. La technologie ASDL - omniprésente en Corée - s'implante à vitesse grand V. La concurrence fait chuter les prix.
Mais ce bouleversement a ses zones d'ombre. L'affaire du virus informatique "I love you", en partie concocté aux Philippines, a montré la puissance de feu des hackers asiatiques. Au Japon, les abus à la carte de crédit sont nombreux, et la cyber-police nipponne est encore embryonnaire. Internet attire aussi les mafias locales: une étude publiée par le cabinet de détectives américains Kroll juge le Web asiatique et les start-up locales "très perméables au blanchiment d'argent.
Source : Le Temps - 3/9/2001
START-UP INVESTORS MAY GET COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES
The government plans to use a state-managed technology fund to compensate investors for possible losses from investment in start-ups over the next five years.
The government will revise the current law on financial assistance to technology developers to help high-tech start-ups attract capital, the Ministry of Finance and Economy said Monday in a statement sent to the National Assembly for its annual review of the ministry.
Under the new plan, the state-managed Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund would select around 100 start-ups for the program after assessing their technologies and management. The fund would receive a fee from each investor in those firms in return for a pledge to make up part of any loss from their investments.
The coverage would be applied to cases where investors lose money invested in companies that go bankrupt or post losses over a certain period of time, according to the ministry. Ministry officials said details of the program would be set by the end of this year.
The ministry said it is considering providing such coverage over the next three to five years for a commission rate of 2 percent to 4 percent a year of the investment amount. It also plans to allow investors to demand that the fund buy their shareholdings.
The ministry said the program would help ease funding difficulties that start-up companies often face during the early stages of their business.
Source by: Joong Ang Ilbo (2001.09.11)
LCD INDUSTRY IN KOREA
The LCD(Liquid Crystal Display) market is still stagnating. LCD companies' facility and equipment investment increased considerably at the end of 1999, but this was met with a sharp increase in PC industry, which is the major buyer of LCD. Consequently, it is causing an oversupply of LCD. With LCD oversupply reaching 10%, the PC makers are expected to have an upper hand in the LCD market, forming a buyer's market.
As a result, profits of Korean companies with 37% of the world's LCD market are expected to get considerably lower and so there is a great interest to find out when the LCD market would start to recover.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN MID-90S
LCD has been the dominant driving force of the display market for the past 10 years. In 1990, the size of the world's LCD market was just $3.7 billion, but it grew more than six times to $22.5 billion by 2000 and the areas of LCD application expanded to Note Books, monitors, mobile handsets and TVs.
The rapid growth in LCD market has revealed some important characteristics. First, the key technology in LCD changed from STN to TFT arrays. The LCD market share of TFT-LCD rose from 3% in 1990 to an estimate of 80% in 2001. And this fast growth in TFT-LCD is closely related to the inclusion of multimedia to PCs. Since the mid-90s, when PCs penetrated into the family PC market and a shift occurred to the Windows environment using GUI(graphic user interface), such multimedia functions as graphics, sound and macromedia flash became more widely used, and needs for bigger and clearer display devices grew. This is why TFT-LCD with a full-color large screen as well as high definition has come to lead the market.
CYCLICAL BUSINESS CYCLE SINCE MID-90S
Second, the market has become quite competitive. Until the early 90s, the world's LCD market had an oligopolistic structure dominated by Japanese firms. However, 1995 onwards, Korean and Taiwanese companies began entering the market, changing its structure into a competitive one. Consequently, the number of LCD producers jumped from around 10 in 1990 to 29 by 2000. And the market share of the top 5 producers declined from 90% level to 62% level over the same period.
The increased competition in the market also has had influenced the mode of competition between LCD makers. Between late 80s to early 90s, competition was mostly concerned with shifting from STN to TFT. But since mid-90s, when the new comers made their way into the market, competition surrounded on the size of the glass substrate. As a result, the cycle of changing the key equipment for the production of LCD shortened. Between 1989 and 1995, there was only one shift in generation of the key equipment, whereas there were such three shifts between 1996 and 2000.
Third, the LCD market has become unstable, moving cyclically. The business cycle in the LCD market has become quite distinctive since the mid-90s and it comes around every three to three and a half years. Such market fluctuations are caused by the fact that LCD is dependent highly on the PC market, that making large-scale investment is inevitable and equipment investment tends to get concentrated in a certain period, and that price elasticity is low because fixed cost is high and production lead time is long.
OVERSUPPLY OF TFT-LCD
Stagnation in LCD market began towards the end of the third quarter last year and this is the third time since 1995 that such slowdowns have taken place. The first two resulted mainly from having excessive equipment, built up as new comers entered the market. But the current depression in LCD business is caused by the rapid deceleration of the PC market. The world's PC market had posted an average sales growth rate of 18% during the late 90s, but since the fourth quarter of last year, the growth rate has been dropping off by quite a large extent and that is also hitting the LCD market.
As supply of LCD exceeds demand, LCD prices are also coming down fast. For example, the average sale price of the 14.1" LCD panel, mainly used in Note Book PCs, dropped 58% from $490 per unit in May last year to $205 per unit May this year. A 15" LCD panel for monitors also fell more than 55% in price from $583 to $253.
Profits are getting thin in LCD companies. Unlike in the 1999 boom, when all LCD companies were in black, it is estimated that all but two will be deep in red in the first quarter of this year. And such deterioration in profits is forcing companies to merge and to downsize their business. For example, Acer and Unipac of Taiwan announced their decision of a merger in the first half of last year, and NEC has decided to withdraw from its LCD(PC) business.
DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT WHEN ECONOMIC RECOVERY WILL COME
There are different views on when this sluggishness in LCD business will come to an end. There is a view that equilibrium will be reached in the first half of next year and in the second half the supply will be in shortage. This is based on the trend that the entry of LCD into monitor market is taking place faster than expected. Increasingly, PC makers are choosing to use LCD monitors and so there is a high possibility of demand for LCD making a faster-than-expected recovery. And if seasonal demand is revived in the fourth quarter of this year, as it has in the past, it would be possible to eliminate excessive supply by year-end, or the first half of next year.
On the other hand, the view that recovery in LCD business will be delayed is grounded on that the major LCD producers will be in full running of the fourth-generation line from the second half of this year. Although it is true that LCD monitors are growing at a faster rate than previously forecasted, operation of the fourth-generation line would increase the supply volume fast and so equilibrium is likely to be pushed to the second half of next year.
MARKET RECOVERY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2002
Although it is difficult to rule out the possibility of a delay in recovery in the LCD business, the past business cycles and the recent trends in the LCD market tend to support the view that the market will recover in the first half of next year.
Historically, market slowdown in the LCD business cycles lasted for about six to seven quarters and it took about three quarters to reach equilibrium after hitting the ground. Assuming that the past trend will continue, it is possible to conclude then that the descent by the LCD market would bottom in the second or third quarter of this year and reach equilibrium in the first half of next year.
However the recent business indicators like the rate at which LCD prices are falling, the status on inventories and the capacity utilization ratio hint at LCD business already nearing a trough. The average prices of LCD made a rapid fall in the past six months, but the rate has begun to decelerate in the second quarter of this year. The falling rate of LCD prices is just one third of the pace at which the price were falling in January and thus it is suggested that the LCD prices are close to hitting the bottom.
There were 8 weeks' worth of LCD inventories in January, but the amount dropped to 4 weeks' in April and from June onwards, inventories are expected to shrink to a 3-week volume. The reduction in inventories is believed to have increased the capacity utilization ratio of the LCD producers. According to DisplaySearch, the Korean LCD producers operated in highs in 60% back in January, but the ratio was up to 80% level in May. Taiwanese makers also increased their capacity utilization ratio from highs in 40% to 70%.
What is more, demand for LCD monitors is rising sharply, owed to the recent fall in LCD prices. In the first quarter, LCD monitor sales rose 84% to 2.3 million compared with the same period a year ago. This is about a 15% rise from the fourth quarter of last year. Notwithstanding the negative growth posted in the PC market, LCD monitor sales surged, which is attributed largely to the fact that the difference between the price of CRT monitors and that of LCD monitors has significantly narrowed and thus lessened the burden of purchasing LCD monitors.
Hence, the market share of LCD monitors in the monitor market is forecasted to increase from 5.8% at the end of 2000 to 12% by the end of this year and to 15% by the first half of next year. The sales volume is also expected to increase from 5.5 million in the first half of this year to 9.8 million in the first half of 2002.
The biggest buyers of LCD, makers of Note Book PCs, are expected to produce some 12 million Note Book PCs in this year's first half, which is similar to the amount produced in the same period a year earlier. However thanks to the fall in prices of Note Book PCs, the number is expected to increase to 16 million in the first half of next year.
Lastly, due to postponement of investment and adjustments in production by LCD producers, the supply capacity of the LCD industry as a whole is expected to increase by just 23%, approximately, from 6.2 million(55mm¡¿650mm) in this year's first half to 7.6 million in next year's first half. For instance, Samsung Electronics and some of the Taiwanese producers have decided to postpone their investment into new lines until the second half of next year, while other companies are downsizing their production in light of the current slowdown in LCD business.
Furthermore, in the case of Taiwanese producers starting their mass production from the second half of this year, they would have difficulty securing productivity due to a lack of experience in the fourth-generation line and thus the growth rate of the actual supply could get lower.
REBUILDING BUSINESS STRATEGY
The LCD producers are rewriting their business strategies in accordance with the changes in market.
In light of the current slump in LCD business, Japanese producers are clearly setting their strategy to concentrate on the home appliances area with high profitability, and withdraw from the medium size LCD panel(12"~15") market. That is, based on their highly sophisticated home appliances market at home, the Japanese makers will concentrate on producing LCD for such products as digital cameras, car navigators, game devices and TVs. This is a market difficult for Korean and Taiwanese producers to enter, for it demands highly advanced technology.
Taiwanese producers are keenly making their way into the Note Book PC market and they are doing so through close alliances with Japanese companies. Through such strategy, the Taiwanese companies are able to secure stable and long-term transactions, and acquire advanced production technology. Consequently, the Taiwanese companies are highly likely to become the direct competitors to Korean producers in the Note Book PCs and LCD monitor markets.
STRENGTHENING OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETENCE & CUSTOMER BASE
Korea's LCD producers have 37% of the world's LCD market and to be able to maintain and consolidate on their market position, they need to strengthen technological competence and customer base. Japanese LCD producers hold patents in the core technologies that determine the quality of LCD and they use those technologies actively in their own products, thus having the advantage of a maximum price premium of around 10% over Korean and Taiwanese competitors. Moreover, the Japanese maintain technological advantage by spurring the production of Poly-Si LCD, which has relatively simple production process, compared with the existing products, and is low in energy consumption.
If the Korean producers to maintain their competitive advantage in the monitor market, they would need to continuously put efforts into securing core technologies. There is also an urgent need for the Korean firms to raise marketing competence to attract producers of Note Book PCs and monitors. Korean producers should make efforts to secure cost advantage through continuous improvement in productivity, and to strengthen customer base through management of quality and delivery. Source : KT-I été 2001
AUTOMAKERS VOW TO ATTAIN EXPORTS OF 1.68 MIL. CARS
Korea's five automakers said yesterday that they will step up an export drive to expand overseas shipments by 10.6 percent from last year to 1.68 million cars worth $13.7 billion this year.
The automotive export target, also representing a 0.2 percent gain over last year's 1.67 million units in terms of volume, was agreed upon during a meeting between Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy Chang Che-shik and chief executives of the five carmakers.
The auto executives - Kim Dong-jin of Hyundai Motor, Kim Noi-myung of Kia Motors, Lee Young-kook of Daewoo Motor, So Jin-kwan of Ssangyong Motor and Jerome Stoll of Renault Samsung Motors - asked Minister Chang to redouble efforts to minimize trade conflicts with foreign governments.
They also demanded that Seoul ease its environmental regulations on diesel-engine vehicles, noting that domestic diesel-engine cars now being shipped to Europe are banned in Korea.
In addition, the government was asked to extend more financing support to local automakers' research and development projects on future-oriented new models.
In response, Minister Chang promised to extend maximum support to help boost car exports, praising the automotive industry as the main pillar of the nation's exports. He also urged the carmakers to pay greater attention to the development of higher-quality car parts.
According to the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, Korea's automotive exports in the first half contracted slightly in terms of vehicle number, but posted a double-digit increase in terms of value. The KAMA said that the nation's first-half car exports fell 1.3 percent year-on-year to 779,971 units from 790,156 units. Measured in terms of the value of the exports, however, the six-month car exports expanded 18.4 percent year-on-year to $6.45 billion from $5.44 billion. Accordingly, the unit export price also rose by 20 percent from $6,893 last year to $8,270, said the KAMA.
It also projected recently that the nation's total automobile output in 2001, estimated at 3.11 million units, would remain virtually unchanged from an annual volume of 3.115 million units in 2000, despite the global economic slowdown. About 45 percent of Korean car exports this year went to North America, up sharply from 38.2 percent last year.
Source by : Korea Herald (2001.09.01)
LE GOUVERNEMENT SUD-COREEN VEUT REGLER LA VENTE DE DAEWOO AVANT LA FIN DU MOIS
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GM DOIT SIGNER AUJOURD'HUI LA LETTRE D'INTENTION POUR LA REPRISE DE DAEWOO
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GM MAKES FINAL OFFER FOR DAEWOO
By Samuel Len
SEOUL (Reuters) - The world's biggest automaker General Motors (GM) has made a final offer for Korea's bankrupt Daewoo Motor, but it excludes the firm's largest and most antiquated plant which employs almost half its local workforce.
"GM has submitted a final offer for Daewoo Motor, but the main Pupyong plant has been excluded," a senior finance ministry official said on Friday.
The future of the Pupyong plant, west of Seoul and built almost 30 years ago, has always been a stumbling block in the negotiations to buy Daewoo Motor as it is not only old, but highly sensitive politically. It was the scene of fiery protests by unionized workers after layoffs in February.
Korean officials were tightlipped in response to the GM offer but the Korean firm's main creditor, state-run Korea Development Bank, said talks with GM were continuing. "Both sides are trying to narrow differences in order to wrap up talks soon."
South Korea has been keen to conclude the talks by the end of this month. In an indication of government thinking, Finance Minister Jin Nyum said on Friday he was willing to deal with the public disappointment if the sale excluded the main plant.
"There can be a lot of criticism (regarding the sale of Daewoo)," Jin said during a radio interview. "But you cannot get anything done if you worry about criticism."
The U.S. auto giant declined to comment on Friday.
The sale of Daewoo Motor, the nation's third largest automaker, is part of a government push to pump new blood into Korea's ailing corporations and bolster international confidence in the country's reforms in the wake of the Asian crisis.
Daewoo Motor is one of the country's biggest companies and the crown jewel of the Daewoo Group DWGR.UL, the second largest Korean conglomerate until its collapse in 1999.
Finance Minister Jin has said he would personally take the blame if the sale fell through or was found disappointing, underscoring the political significance of the deal ahead of presidential elections next year.
DECISION TIME
The finance ministry official said creditors were trying to balance economic realities and a possible public backlash that could result from excluding the Pupyong plant in a GM takeover.
"The fate of the Pupyong plant cannot be resolved based purely on economic considerations and it is a politically sensitive matter," the official said. "But now is the time to make a decision. Time is not on our side."
GM and partner Fiat (FIA) of Italy submitted an initial proposal in May to acquire Daewoo, but have said little since then about the progress of talks.
Analysts said a deal that excludes the main plant would increase the government's burden, because of soured labor sentiment and the difficulties of keeping the plant operating.
Since rescuing Daewoo Motor in August 1999, creditors have provided $2 billion in support funds to keep the automaker running. "There is no Korean company that is financially capable of reviving the facility and I've yet to hear of a foreign company showing interest in the plant," said Song Sang-hoon, an auto analyst at Dongwon Economic Research Institute.
Another leading automaker, Ford Motor Co (F), made a non-binding $6.04 billion offer for Daewoo Motor 11 months ago, but the delayed sale has battered its value.
Daewoo was saddled with more than 22 trillion won in liabilities as of end-2000, compared to 9.1 trillion won in assets. Daewoo Motor Sales (04550) shares, which trade as a proxy for unlisted Daewoo Motor, closed up 2.6 percent at 3,090 won, while the broader Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KS11) ended down 3.41 percent.
Source : 2001 Reuters Limited - 31/8/2001
GM-DAEWOO MOTOR DEAL IN FINAL STAGE: JIN NYUM
General Motors' talks to take over Daewoo Motor are now in the final stage, Minister of Finance and Economy Jin Nyum said yesterday, dismissing speculation that the U.S. auto giant has given up in its bid for the ailing Korean carmaker.
"Daewoo creditors and GM are now in the process of fine-tuning memorandum of understanding on the latter's acquisition of Daewoo Motor," said Jin in a meeting with reporters.
"In other words, the negotiations have entered into the last stage and the announcement is imminent," the minister said, declining to give further information.
He stressed that he is ready to step into the negotiations to help Daewoo creditors reach a sensitive decision, indicating that the Korean government has already determined its stance on the fate of Daewoo's controversial main car plant in Bupyeong, west of Seoul. Contrary to his earlier remarks, however, Jin said that the government will not impose any specific deadline for the conclusion of the GM-Daewoo deal.
Last week, GM allegedly expressed its intention to exclude the 30-year-old Bupyeong plant from its takeover list, in its final offer sent to the Seoul government and Daewoo creditors.
Instead of giving up the Bupyeong plant, the U.S. automaker reportedly proposed increasing the takeover price. In addition, GM also proposed that all Daewoo cars built by the Bupyeong plant be sold through GM dealership networks.
Stuck in a dilemma between economic realities and a possible public backlash that could result from the exclusion of the Bupyeong plant, government officials and creditors in Seoul have delayed their responses to the GM proposal.
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.09.05)
GM TO SIGN DAEWOO DEAL TODAY; TO BUY RESEARCH CENTER,
OTHER KEY FACILITIES
General Motors will sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on its takeover of Daewoo Motor this morning, ending months of negotiations for the control of the ailing Korean automaker, the Korea Development Bank said yesterday.
Shortly after sealing the MOU at the KDB, the main creditor for Daewoo Motor, GM and creditor officials will announce details of the acquisition contracts in a news conference at the same venue, the bank said.
The exact price for the acquisition of most of Daewoo's domestic and overseas operations, excluding the aging main car plant in Bupyeong, is not known, but creditor and government sources estimated it at about $1 billion to $1.2 billion.
Instead of excluding the Bupyeong plant, GM is expected to include Daewoo's research and development center and maintenance division, both located at the controversial main car plant, in a gesture to help guarantee the bankrupt automaker's long-term growth potential, said the sources.
But it still remains uncertain whether Daewoo's car engine plant, also situated at the Bupyeong plant, will be included in the takeover deal or not, they said. After the signing of the MOU this morning, GM is planning to conduct an in-depth screening of Daewoo's assets and debts before initialing the final contract by the end of this year.
The sale of the ailing Daewoo Motor, the nation's second largest automaker in terms of output capacity, has been viewed as the centerpiece of Korea's corporate restructuring drive, though the talks with GM dragged on for nearly four months. In late May, GM and its alliance partner Fiat presented a letter of intent to buy Daewoo.
In this regard, a ranking government official confirmed that Seoul will be ready to extend substantial tax breaks to help facilitate GM's smooth absorption of Daewoo.
According to the sources, the U.S. car giant will sell around 200,000 cars rolling out of the 29-year-old Bupyeong plant each year for the next six years before deciding in 2006 whether to acquire it. They speculate that the actual cash infusion by GM into Daewoo may amount to 500 billion to 600 billion won, as GM and Daewoo creditors are known to share stakes in the so-called GM-Daewoo Motor at a ratio of 65 to 35 percent under the purchases and assumptions (P&As) contract.
Shinyoung Securities said in its latest automotive report that the upcoming inroad of the world's largest automaker into Korea will eventually have a devastating impact on the domestic automotive industry, now controlled by the Hyundai Motor Group. GM's full-scale entry, together with Renault Samsung's continuous facility expansion, will eventually turn Korea's automotive market into a fierce three-way battle, it forecast.
In addition, GM's acquisition of Daewoo plants in Changwon and Gunsan will sharply enhance the American automaker's competitiveness in the global minicar and subcompact markets. Daewoo's popular 800-cc-engine Matiz, produced by the Changwon plant, controls over 70 percent of the domestic minicar market and enjoys mounting sales in European and emerging-economy markets.
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.09.21)
KOREA SAYS GM-DAEWOO DEAL DONE
SEOUL (Reuters) - A broad agreement on the sale of bankrupt Daewoo Motor to General Motors Corp has been reached but the scheduled signing of the deal on Friday might be delayed, South Korea's commerce minister said on Thursday.
The government has urged an early completion of the deal, seen as a sign of Korea's commitment to restructure its debt-ridden corporate sector. Sources close to the talks had told Reuters a memorandum of understanding would be signed on Friday.
"The signing for the sale of Daewoo Motor to GM might be delayed because details need fine-tuning, but a broad agreement has been reached," Commerce Minister Chang Che-shik told Reuters in a sidebar interview after a breakfast meeting with shipbuilders. He declined to elaborate.
The country's leading daily Chosun Ilbo reported on Thursday GM has agreed to a deal including the payment of $400 million in cash for Daewoo Motor's assets.
NEW JOINT VENTURE TO BE SET UP
To take over the bankrupt automaker, GM and Daewoo creditors plan to set up a new joint venture company capitalized at $1.8 billion.
GM would issue $1.2 billion in preferred shares to creditors and pay $400 million in cash, while creditors would invest the remaining $200 million to the new company, the Chosun said.
Minister Chang would not comment on the news reports.
On Tuesday, a high-ranking creditor source told Reuters GM was expected to pay more than $1 billion for a slice of bankrupt Daewoo Motor's sprawling operations.
GM and Daewoo's creditors have provided few details of talks aimed at rescuing at least some of the 16 plants operated by South Korea's third-largest automaker, one of the most prominent casualties of Asia's 1997/98 economic crisis.
GM officials could not be reached for comment.
The U.S. auto giant and Italian partner Fiat, which stand to gain a foothold in one of Asia's largest and most insular auto markets, made an undisclosed offer for Daewoo in May and the two sides have been in talks to finalize the deal since.
Creditors led by state-owned Korea Development Bank have been spurred to wrap up efforts, that began more than two years ago, to sell the company.
Delays in clinching a deal have caused the automaker's asset value to plummet, reducing the expected sale price to a fraction of the 7.7 trillion won that Ford Motor Co offered last year. Ford subsequently withdrew its nonbinding bid.
Daewoo and creditor sources have said the most likely outcome would involve GM buying Daewoo's relatively new domestic plants at Changwon and Kunsan.
Daewoo's oldest plant, in Pupyong, west of Seoul, would be excluded but GM would market its output for several years.
Daewoo has four plants at home and 12 overseas, including manufacturing operations in Poland, Uzbekistan and China.
Its liabilities topped 22 trillion won compared with 9.1 trillion won in assets at the end of 2000.
Creditors have spent $2 billion to keep Daewoo running since stepping in to rescue the company in August 1999.
Shares in Daewoo Motor Sales, which trade as a proxy for the unlisted automaker, were down 15 won at 3,365 at 0318 GMT.
By Kim Myong-hwan Source : Reuters - 19/09/2001
GM'S TAKEOVER OF DAEWOO SEEN HURTING HYUNDAI, KIA
Hyundai Motor and affiliate Kia Motors will remain unscathed by General Motors' imminent acquisition of Daewoo Motor in the short term, but may suffer substantial market-share losses in the longer term, a report said yesterday.
Shinyoung Securities said in its latest automotive report that the upcoming inroad of the world's largest automaker into Korea will eventually have a devastating impact on the domestic automotive industry, now controlled by the Hyundai Motor Group. GM is expected to sign a memorandum of understanding on buying Daewoo Motor plants in Korea for over $1 billion Friday at the earliest, according to informed government sources.
The Shinyoung report forecast that GM's full-scale entry, together with Renault Samsung's continuous facility expansion, will eventually turn Korea's automotive market into a fierce three-way battle.
"In the first one or two years, GM may refrain from aggressive marketing in Korea to concentrate on strengthening Daewoo's production infrastructure through assembly-line realignments and other means," said the report. "Therefore, the short-term effect from GM's acquisition of Daewoo on Hyundai Motor and the local automotive industry could be negligible."
In the longer term, however, the normalized Daewoo Motor and the expanded Renault Samsung will pose an enormous threat to Hyundai and Kia, which jointly control nearly 80 percent of Korea's 1.7-million-unit-a-year automotive market.
On Tuesday, Seoul's informed sources said that GM and the Korean government have reached an agreement on the takeover of Daewoo Motor and are scheduled to make a formal announcement this Friday at the earliest.
GM reportedly agreed to take over all of Daewoo Motor's domestic plants, excluding the aging main car plant in Bupyeong. The U.S. car giant will instead sell around 200,000 cars rolling out of the 29-year-old Bupyeong plant each year for the next six years before deciding in 2006 whether to acquire it.
According to industry analysts, GM's acquisition of Daewoo plants in Changwon and Gunsan will sharply enhance the American automaker's competitiveness in the global minicar and subcompact markets.
Daewoo's popular 800-cc-engine Matiz, produced by the Changwon plant, controls over 70 percent of the domestic minicar segment and enjoys mounting sales in European and emerging-economy markets. In August alone, 4,719 units of Matiz were sold in Korea. The highly automated Gunsan plant builds mostly subcompact sedans, whereas the Bupyeong plant is responsible for mid- and large sedans with engine displacement of over 1,800 cc.
Stock-market analysts speculate that the actual cash infusion by GM into Daewoo may amount to 500 billion to 600 billion won, as GM and Daewoo creditors are known to share stakes in the new Daewoo Motor at a ratio of 65 to 35 percent under the purchases and assumptions (P&As) contract.
After initialing the MOU this week or next, GM is planning to conduct an in-depth screening into Daewoo's assets and debts before signing the final contract by the end of this year. (cmyoo@koreaherald.co.kr) Source : Korea Herald 2001.09.20
BMW ESTABLISHES FINANCIAL SERVICES UNIT IN KOREA
BMW has announced the establishment of BMW Financial Services Korea, the first foreign manufacturer-backed finance company in the ROK. It is scheduled to begin operations on September 1.
BMW Financial Services Korea is a wholly owned subsidiary of BMW group and is capitalized at 20 billion won (US$15.6 million). To begin with, it will offer hire-purchase packages for new and used cars and motorcycles, moving on to offer finance leasing for new vehicles sold through authorized BMW dealers.
Within one year it should be providing inventory financing to BMW dealers and eventually, regulations allowing, the product range will extend to insurance and credit services.
Horst Kolo, president of BMW Financial Services Asia/South Africa, who will also lead the Korean unit, holding the post of chairman. Source : AsiaAutoOnline - 28/8/2001
CONSTRUCTION D'UNE LIAISON FERROVIAIRE ENTRE LA RUSSIE ET LA COREE DU SUD
Des spécialistes ferroviaires sud-coréens ont entamé une étude sur place du Transsibérien russe dans le cadre du projet de liaison ferroviaire Russie-Corée du sud.
La délégation sud-coréenne empruntera le transsibérien mercredi 29 août de la ville russe de Khasan, à la frontière nord-coréenne, jusqu'à Novossibirsk, selon l'agence Itar-Tass.
Cette délégation se rendra ensuite à Moscou pour rencontrer le ministre russe des transports Nikolaï Aksenenko, selon le service de presse de la région russe de Primorie cité par l'agence.
Le projet d'une liaison ferrée ininterrompue entre la Corée du sud et la Russie, qui passerait par la Corée du nord, avait donné lieu le 14 août à la signature d'un accord de coopération en ce sens entre Moscou et Pyongyang, lors de la visite en Russie du leader nord-coréen Kim Jong-Il.
La construction de la voie à travers la Corée du Nord, entre Khasan et la frontière avec la Corée du Sud reviendra à la Russie, selon cet accord. La Corée du Sud devrait moderniser sa partie de la voie et l'adapter à l'écartement standard des voies en Russie
L'établissement de cette jonction ferroviaire doit faciliter le trafic commercial entre les marchés d'Asie et d'Europe. ( 29/08/2001 ) Source : Batiactu.com
L'ARMEE DE L'AIR COREENNE HESITE ENTRE LE RAFALE ET LE F15
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SECURITE AERIENNE : LES ETATS-UNIS CLASSENT LA COREE DU SUD DANS LES PAYS A RISQUE
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SEOUL TO SELL 20% STAKE IN KT&G ABROAD IN SEPT.
The Korean government will sell off around 20 percent of the state-run Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corp. (KT&G), by issuing global depositary receipts (GDRs) and exchangeable bonds next month, the Ministry of Finance and Economy said yesterday.
The remaining 33 percent of the government's 53 percent stake will be sold domestically before the end of the year, completing the privatization of the tobacco monopoly, the ministry said.
"Under the government's privatization plan for state-owned enterprises, around 20 percent of the government-held stake in KT&G will be sold off next month through a GDRs issue," the ministry said in a statement.
Given the current share price, around $500-600 million in foreign capital could be raised through the GDR issuance, according to the ministry.
Foreign credit rating agencies, such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's have conducted due diligence on the state-owned enterprise, and gave a "Baa2" and "BBB" credit rating, respectively, to the KT&G GDRs.
The government's 53 percent stake in KT&G breaks down to 13.8 percent held by the finance ministry, 25.3 percent owned by Industrial Bank of Korea, 7 percent by Korea Ex-Im Bank, and 6.9 percent by Korea Development Bank.
Last year, the government placed exchangeable bonds overseas on pledges of a 10 percent stake held by Industrial Bank of Korea.
The government had planned to sell off its stake from the first half of the year, but delayed the sale schedule because of the depressed stock market.
Meanwhile, the government last month raised $2.24 billion by selling off a 17.8 percent stake in Korea Telecom through an issue of ADRs listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Source by: Korea Herald (2001.08.24)
MALGRE SA DETERMINATION, SEOUL PEINE A RESTRUCTURER SES CONGLOMERATS
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SUCCESSFUL RESTRUCTURING CASES OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES
Among the successful cases in Korea, four stock exchange-listed companies and one state-owned enterprise were selected as companies that succeeded in restructuring without outside aid. The criteria for selection included: 1) companies or financial institutions that went through serious crises but overcame them without public fund injections or the aid of "Workout" programs, 2) those that reached top rankings either domestically or globally by transforming their main businesses into high value-added ones, and finally, 3) those whose restructuring success is displayed in financial statements or in stock prices. Companies or financial institutions that sold their main businesses or moved into unrelated businesses, those that received public funds, and those that took part in "Workout" programs or corporate restructuring vehicles (CRVs) were excluded from the selection process.
The first successful case of restructuring was Hankuk Electric Glass Co., which specializes in manufacturing glass for picture tubes. On the verge of undergoing bankruptcy proceedings and being liquidated, this company successfully revitalized itself through its CEO's leadership. Previously, its position in the domestic picture tube market had fallen drastically due to huge unsold inventory and poor product quality. It even was eventually judged as "hopeless" in 1997 by Booz Allen & Hamilton, a leading foreign consulting firm. Then the company hit bottom with a labor strike that lasted for 77 days. However, Seo Doo Chil, newly appointed as CEO at the end of 1997, set up clear goals and promoted drastic restructuring. Consequently, within three years the company transformed itself as evidenced by its superb return on equity (ROE) ranking, which placed first among the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange.
Another positive example is the Pacific Corporation, a representative cosmetics firm in Korea, that succeeded in restructuring by concentrating on its core business. In the early- to mid-1990s, the company had suffered from declining market share due to over-diversification into unrelated sectors, opening of the domestic cosmetics market and resulting changes in distribution channels. But beginning in 1995, restructuring started under the leadership of the second son of the founder of the company. He quickly disposed of non-core and unprofitable operations, and consolidated similar businesses. He also focused on creating high value-added products and so-called "hit" products, and strengthened marketing, thereby contributing to a significant increase in the market share of the company. Again, it was the initiative of the CEO that led to the success of the company's restructuring.
Meanwhile, Samsung Electronics, a chipmaker leading the global semiconductor industry, provides an example of the successful creation of a high value-added business by adaptation to the IT revolution. It had suffered from a sharp decline in its net profits due to a drop in international chip prices after the boom of the global semiconductor industry in the mid-1990s. Even worse, the breakout of the currency crisis in 1997 aggravated the situation of the company, which then suffered from a greater lack of liquidity. In reaction, Samsung Electronics embarked on intense restructuring through reorganization and downsizing. First, it disposed of unprofitable businesses and focused exclusively on IT-related ones. Second, it sold non-performing assets and reduced manpower to cut costs. Third, it rebuilt its organization into a consumer-oriented one. Finally, it promoted management transparency and tried to fully adopt global standards. In brief, Samsung Electronics' success was due to its continued restructuring process, and the opportune shift in global trends during the IT revolution at the end of the 1990s.
In contrast, Humax, a domestic venture company specializing in consumer electronics products, successfully transformed by devoting itself to a promising industry. Faced with a crisis due to the bankruptcy of companies it had dealings with and a resulting sharp decline of exports, Humax stopped producing CD karaoke players, and focused exclusively on the digital TV set-top box business, which was a rapidly growing business and also high value-added. Moreover, it utilized outsourcing and operated as a "classic" venture organization, reducing bureaucratic management inefficiency. Consequently, Humax was able to escape from crisis through its early advance into and concentration on a promising business.
Shinhan Life, a life insurance company, saved itself by focusing on profitability. With a business model that had focused only on sales expansion, it was confronted with problems due to market opening to foreign competitors and liberalization of financial markets in the 1990s. Recognizing the limits of its previous business strategy, the company, first of all, reduced its sales network. Also, in 1999, it began to move away from its tightly controlled bureaucratic structure to emphasize the autonomy of the sales force . Furthermore, the company introduced the strongest employee-incentive system in the domestic insurance industry, in order to balance out a reduced sales network with greater sales efforts by employees. Summing up, by focusing on quality-oriented restructuring instead of adhering to size expansion, the company was able to reverse years of losses.
Finally, the consolidation of three agricultural-related government agencies into one, the Korea Agricultural & Rural Infrastructure Corporation serves as a strong signal for the need to increase efficiency to successfully effect restructuring. In fact, the consolidation of the three agencies had been a long-cherished desire of Korean agricultural policy as all three shared the same function, which was to maintain the agricultural production base. The necessity of the consolidation was triggered by the worsening management of the Farmland Improvement Cooperative, one of the three agencies. Accordingly, the government promoted consolidation and overcame the resistance of various interest groups, including employees, by portraying the consolidation as a noble cause to improve the quality of services provided to farmers. In summary, the reform's success was attributable to the government's strong defining of its obligations and its promotion of reform in a consistent manner.
From these experiences, several lessons can be drawn. First, it is clear that corporate restructuring should be promoted in a continual and timely manner in the future. Second, the decisiveness, driving force and strategic judgement of the CEO has a truly profound influence on the outcome of reforms and is a necessary condition for successful restructuring. Finally, an overhaul of the corporate management system is required to rebuild the business framework of companies from the ground up. Otherwise, the restructuring efforts may continue to tend to be mired in go-nowhere situations, dragged down by existing management. Source : KT-I été 2001
HYUNDAI MOTOR ACCELERATES GLOBAL MANAGEMENT
The Hyundai Motor Group's overseas output capacity has risen to 739,000 units, compared with its domestic capacity of 3.04 million units, indicating the auto conglomerate's rapid globalization, industry observers said yesterday.
According to the experts, Hyundai Motor and its affiliated Kia Motors are credited with a respective offshore output capacity of 496,000 units and 243,000 units, or a total of 739,000 units, while Daewoo Motor, viewed as the forerunner in overseas expansion, boasts an offshore capacity of 920,000 units.
Including domestic capacity of 3.04 million units, the Hyundai Motor Group's aggregate vehicle production capacity amounts to 3.77 million, compared with Daewoo's 1.98 million units.
The number of overseas manufacturing plants by Hyundai and Kia stands at 15 and 10, respectively, while Daewoo's offshore plants total 13. "Six of Daewoo's 13 overseas plants were concentrated in Eastern Europe. But Hyundai's offshore operations are evenly spread across the world, with seven in China, six in Southeast Asia, three in India and Pakistan, three in North Africa, two in South America and one each in Russia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
"Hyundai will continue to expand global production volume to over 4 million units to get an upper hand in the mergers and acquisitions market," said a company executive.
On the possibility of Hyundai building a manufacturing plant in the United States, he said that the management is still thinking about that, though no decision has yet been made. North America accounts for 40 percent of Hyundai's total exports.
Following renewed strategies for North America and Europe, meanwhile, Hyundai has recently unveiled plans to expand in Southeast Asia to take advantage of the planned opening in 2003 of a regional free trade area.
Hyundai's vehicles are now locally assembled in Malaysia and Indonesia and the company wants to venture into the Philippines and Thailand, said another company official. He noted that the company aims to sell 30,000 cars in Asia, excluding India and China.
In September, Hyundai is scheduled to roll out the "Tuscani" sports car to compete in global markets with leading sports cars made by foreign automakers, such as Toyota and Audi. Source by : Korea Herald (2001.08.28)
HANBITSOFT GETS GLOBAL GAMES GOING
By Kim Sung-jin
HanbitSoft is a computer game publisher and Internet solutions provider that has successfully distributed here over 2.4 million copies of ``Starcraft'', a popular real time strategy simulation game, about a third of the game's total worldwide sales.
It is the undisputed domestic game distributor that has distribution channels through some 800 retailers nationwide, dominating 53.2 percent of the local computer game market. The company tries to provide quality games at the cheapest price, therefore, pursues one-tier distribution channel directly with retailers.
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However, this fame is hindering the company's prosperity at the moment, stopping the company from going public and getting listed on the technology- packed Kosdaq stock market. Kosdaq suggested that HanbitSoft's heavy reliance on major foreign game title imports is a serious set back for participation on the Kosdaq, since there is the possibility that it may fail to renew its exclusive licensing contracts with foreign game developers.
HanbitSoft received a re-examination as a result of its Kosdaq preliminary screening process last month.
``It is regrettable that we failed to go public this time, but I think receiving an appropriate assessment and value at the right time is what's more important,'' said HanbitSoft CEO Kim Young-man.
Kyobo Securities, one of HanbitSoft's financial managers, also is optimistic on the company's listing, saying that the game publisher will have no difficulty in passing the Kosdaq listing procedures when it shows its capability to develop its own quality game titles.
However, it is a general misconception that HanbitSoft is only a game distributor. The company has developed indigenous, dazzling computer games and computer related technologies over the past two years.
HanbitSoft is currently enjoying a steady increase in sales of its edu- tainment games ``Good Friend Rex'' and ``Digimon Treasure Island''. It has sold over 90,000 copies each.
The company exported ``Good Friend Rex'' to Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China. It is confident about its online game ``Tantra'' as well, which it plans to commercialize next April.
HanbitSoft said the game is so good that it is afraid all other online gaming companies might have to shut down their business with its release.
``We plan to focus more on console-type arcade video games because we believe the arcade video game era will come again when it links with the Internet, enabling gamers to enjoy network arcade games,'' Kim said.
The company also developed its own electronic book and personal digital assistant (PDA) solutions that boast of high compatibility and efficient memory compression. The company said its PDF solution ``PDF Invader'' posted sales of 100 million won a month, exporting their solutions to Fujitsu of Japan and Pedagog of the U.K. It plans to roll out its console- type arcade video game at the end of this year, and its joint venture, Hexplex, is currently providing mobile games to LG Telecom.
Moreover, HanbitSoft plans to release its in-house developed Internet video-phone solutions, ``Face Call'' and ``Face Conference,'' which provide a much clearer picture and sound. A company official said it is superior to Dialpad's videophone solution and users no longer need to go through a hassle while talking online to each other.
In addition, HanbitSoft exports its top-of-the-line codec technology to the U.K. Kim explained that its unrivaled codec technology is used for automatic speed cameras on street corners. Its codec technology compresses memory of 100 megabits down to 2.6 megabits. Codec is an algorithm that compresses and decompresses video and audio files, making them small enough to be accessible over the Internet. Codec eliminates redundant data in a file thus drastically reducing its size.
HanbitSoft is a pearl hidden in the mud. Kim said the company's focus on game distribution in the past was part of its path to become a successful game publisher while admitting that he failed to polish the pearl by neglecting investor relations.
``The term game publisher is unfamiliar with Koreans. I had difficulty explaining what a game publisher is. As part of becoming a game publisher, we focused on distribution. I guess the financial sector didn't understand it,'' said Kim.
The game publisher business refers to companies that handle the entire business of getting video games to the people from planning, development, marketing and distribution to customer services.
``It is true that distribution is a core part of the gaming industry. In those terms, HanbitSoft gets a good score, but its high reliance on foreign game import is one demerit for the company. Because its revenue stream is not viewed as being solid,
HanbitSoft must diversify its revenue stream. Its game production capability is not proven in the market, either,'' said Kim Tae-hyung, a researcher at Hanyang Securities.
HanbitSoft posted sales of 40.1 billion won and 9 billion won in net income over the first half this year. This is nearly double the figures last year when the company marked 43.4 billion won in sales and 10.1 billion won in net income.
It is true that its strong performance is largely based on steady sales of ``Starcraft'' and ``Diablo 2'', which together take nearly 80 percent of its sales, but HanbitSoft is ready to transform itself into an independent online entertainment group, not to mention a game publisher. The company expects its sales to reach 80 billion won this year.
According to the Korea Game Promotion Center Local gaming market is expected to reach 1,445 billion won this year and 2,029 billion won in 2002. World gaming market will reach $157 billion this year and $208 billion the next.
Kim explained that the company is benchmarking Vivendi International Interactive, the multimedia arm of France-based Vivendi Interactive.
``Generally, to distribute a video game, it requires marketing costs that equal the costs invested in development. Local venture game developers have been unsuccessful in marketing their games, but with our solid customer and strong distribution base, we can commercialize any quality games right now,'' Kim said confidently.
The company has been preparing to become a global game publisher, educating their labor to acquire top-notch technologies. It has dispatched its employees to Blizzard and to the BBC to study their advanced game engineering and media content development systems. It has also invested some 350 million won and opened HanbitSoft Digital Campus, a video game related engineering and content development school, to enhance local technology.
With these diverse business areas, HanbitSoft plans to become a total entertainment group. HanbitSoft plans to expand its business areas further to animation, game character business, and game sound tracks in the future.
``I heard that HanbitSoft is extending its business areas into game development and planning, from its core business area of distribution. The gaming market is a high risk, high return market. Since HanbitSoft's entry into these two new business areas has an extremely high risk, the market should watch closely a little bit longer,'' said Cho Young-hoon, an analyst at Good Morning Securities.
``It's the same for HanbitSoft's online games,'' he continued. ``Since the domestic market is flooded with game providers, it is difficult for newcomers to enter the market. For arcade games, the market itself is not in good condition. The most important factor for a gaming company is to secure a stable revenue stream.'' sjkim@koreatimes.co.kr
Source : Korea Times - 4/9/2001
SK : EMERGING AS INTEGRATED ENERGY CONGLOMERATE
By Prof Kim Sung-soo
The period between 1980 and 1991 when the late SK chairman Chey Jong-hyon was moving from his 50s to 60s was perhaps the most significant in SK's history.
The 11-year period may be broken up into three main segments: corporate transformation between 1980 and 1983, vertical integration through large- scale investments between 1984 and 1988 and completion of the vertical integration between 1989 and 1991 with the realization of the fundamental goal of covering everything from ``petroleum to fibers.''
The most important event to take place during this critical period was the acquisition of Korea Oil Corp. in December 1980, which took the entire business community by surprise.
Through the acquisition, SK was able to transform Yukong Ltd. from a simple oil refining company into one which specializes in integrated energy businesses and chemicals.
At the same time, Sunkyong-Teijin was turning into a chemical company with polyester film producer Sunkyong Chemical transforming into a magnetic tape maker.
Along with vertical integration, Chey invested an enormous 1.5 trillion won for the completion of the Ulsan Complex with nine industrial plants in June 1991.
As a result, SK emerged as a world-class corporation with vertically integrated businesses ranging from petroleum exploration and petrochemical to films, tapes and textiles.
Going back to the earlier stages of the vertical integration, Chey was inaugurated as president of Korea Oil Corp. on Dec. 23, 1980. This signaled the privatization of the state-run company and the drafting of a new corporate map of Korea.
Chey's management principles would become clear in his inauguration speech, a part of which follows:
``At Sunkyong, I've had the experience of founding numerous new companies and closing down some of them and the most important factor in pursuing these projects was communication. The reality is that an organization becomes strong when there is clear communication among all employees.
``At the same time, it is vital that a businessman is able to exercise common sense in the decision-making process which helps it improve efficiency and create a sound corporate environment.''
As seen above, Chey placed top priority on communication and the exercising of common sense in acquiring Korea Oil Corp. and moving into the petroleum business.
Resorting to these basic principles, Chey proceeded to acquire Hungkook Sangsa, which dealt with petroleum products, and on July 1, 1982, he changed Korea Oil 's corporate name into Yukong Ltd.
Then, on May 21, 1983, Yukong moved into its own headquarters with the celebration of its 20th founding anniversary.
Meanwhile, recognizing the need for maritime transport services for the stable supply of crude oil and other petroleum products, Chey founded Yukong Line on Jan. 18, 1982 and named incumbent chairman Son Kil-seung, who was then head of corporate planning, as its president.
That year, Yukong Line secured two 250,000-ton large-scale crude oil carriers from Panama, christened them ``Yukong Leader'' and ``Yukong Pioneer,'' and launched its maritime transport services.
In addition to delivering crude oil to Yukong, the new company signed long- term contracts with Shell for transporting crude oil from Ecuador and Brunei, making it possible for it to realize profits of 218 million won in the first year and 923 million won in the next.
Back at the SK headquarters, Chey became increasingly aware of the need to reorganize SK's corporate structure which had a weak financial structure due to over-diversification and the acquisition of an excessive volume of real estate.
Chey was acutely aware that SK had to secure greater international competitiveness and this meant merging companies in similar fields and disposing of them while pulling out investments in other affiliated companies.
For subsidiaries with particularly weak finances, he introduced programs for making improvements before disposing of them at competitive prices.
As a result of the aggressive restructuring, the number of subsidiaries was reduced from the 22 in 1980 to just 11 in 1983, three years in which SK went through a drastic corporate transformation.
Even as restructuring was intensively underway in 1982, Chey designated the next 10 years as the period for achieving long-term objectives and five years for mid-term goals.
While adopting these mid- and long- term corporate strategies, Chey would emphasize the importance of fostering a strong brain pool of specialized professionals as part of his human resource development plan.
Between 1984 and 1988, Chey moved ahead with plans for realizing vertical integration through large-scale investments.
Based on the successful operation of Yukong during the first three years, Chey reconfirmed his objective of engaging in the widest scope of businesses, from ``petroleum to fibers.''
Under the plan, Chey and SK proceeded to complete a number of new industrial plants for producing dimethyl terephthalate, the intermediary material for producing polyester, and other chemicals.
The completion of these facilities as part of his vertical integration plan meant that SK was able to secure primary and intermediary materials at competitive prices and improved stability.
At the same time, Chey continued to stress the importance of developing human resources and taking up the challenge to secure new technologies as the basis for enhancing international competitiveness.
Along with the transformation of the business scope of SK subsidiaries, Sunkyong Ltd. achieved the milestone of exporting $1 billion worth of products within 10 years of its birth.
Around the same period, Chey renamed Sunkyong Chemical SKC and launched new efforts to establish SKC as an international brand for all types of magnetic tapes, including audio and video tapes and compact discs, investing as much as $3 million in overseas advertising.
Reinforced by tested quality and performance, SKC quickly emerged as a world-class brand for its line of products in the late 1980s.
Deputy business editor Nho Joon-hun translates this series, which is based on a book by the same name. _ ED. jakenho@koreatimes.co.kr Source : Korea Times - 3/9/2001
SAMSUNG DEFIE LES SCEPTIQUES
Les cinq places de marché électroniques du conglomérat sud-coréen commencent à faire leurs preuves
Roh Sang-Hong, 51 ans, est intarissable sur son dernier coup. Le Coréen revient tout juste d'un voyage à Sapporo, sur l'île d'Hokkaido, au Japon. L'homme rayonne de joie : le troisième marché aux poissons du Japon vient de s'en gager à effectuer chaque année pour 10 millions de dollars (11 M EURO) d'échanges commerciaux en saumon, thon et crabe sur fish Round.com, la place de marché électronique qu'il dirige, spécialisée dans le poisson congelé. Roh a déjà pris dans ses filets deux cent soixante et onze grossistes et détaillants majeurs des pays du bassin Pacifique. Et tandis que l'équivalent de 94 millions de dollars (103,4 M EURO) de poisson congelé s'y sont d'ores et déjà échangés, Roh compte tripler ce volume d'ici à décembre, puis le doubler l'an prochain. Les bénéfices seront au rendez-vous, annonce-t-il, à l'horizon mars 2002, date du deuxième anniversaire de Fish Round.
Une croissance rapide qui rappelle les plus beaux jours des sociétés Internet, très loin de la dure réalité d'aujourd'hui, qui voit les places de marché électroniques faire grise mine. Cependant, FishRound est une jeune pousse peu banale, et Roh, un créateur d'entreprise aguerri. L'homme a une expérience de 25 ans chez Samsung Corp., le pôle d'échanges commerciaux du plus puissant et plus rentable des conglomérats, ou chaebol, de Corée du Sud. L'offre de Samsung couvre un vaste spectre qui s'étend des semi-conducteurs à l'acier, avec rien moins que 25 milliards de dollars (27,5 milliards d'euros) de mar chandises écoulées l'an dernier. Un volume qui a rapporté à sa branche commerciale l'équivalent de 336 mil lions de dollars (369,6 M EURO) en frais de transaction.
Une " guerre de dix ans "
Samsung, qui détient FishRound à hauteur de 70 %, a en outre aiguillé sur Roh la moitié de sa clientèle, appâtée par des commissions parfois inférieures de 75 % à celles qui se pratiquent sur les opérations classiques. Ces frais restreints permettent aussi à Roh de courtiser de nouveaux clients tel le Sapporo Fish Market, par ailleurs demandeurs de services à marge plus élevée comme l'expédition, l'entreposage ou l'assurance.
Pas question de s'endormir sur ses lauriers. Dès avril 2000, Samsung a amorcé le lancement de quatre nouvelles places de marché spécialisées dans le commerce de l'acier, des produits chimiques, du textile et des fournitures médicales, produits qu'elle diffuse déjà dans le circuit traditionnel. Et cette offre devrait encore s'étoffer. L'entreprise estime que les frais de transaction réduits sur ses sites Internet généreront une hausse de 20 % de la demande sur ses prestations classiques. Samsung espère ainsi effectuer sur ses cinq places de marché l'équivalent de 2,8 milliards de dollars (3,08 milliards d'euros) d'échanges commerciaux d'ici à la fin de l'année, pour atteindre le chiffre record de 7 milliards de dollars (7,7 milliards d'euros) de chiffre d'affaires l'an prochain. Mieux : plus de la moitié de ces transactions proviennent de nouveaux clients. Samsung envisage de dégager des profits sur tous ses sites d'ici à la mi-2002.
Tout cela entre dans ce que Lim Young-hak, directeur de la stratégie et du développement de la firme, nomme la " guerre de dix ans " menée par Samsung pour devenir la société d'échanges internationaux la plus connectée du monde. " Nous voulons faire partie de ceux qui définiront les standards du commerce du vingt et unième siècle ", explique Lim. En ligne de mire : atteindre 150 millions de dollars (165 M EURO) de profits d'ici à 2003, soit une progression de 160 %, en combinant des réductions de coûts et les revenus de nouvelles " vaches à lait ". A cette fin, l'entreprise transférera la totalité de ses activités poisson congelé et textile sur le Web.
Samsung n'a, du reste, guère le choix. Son rôle d'intermédiaire commercial connaît une érosion constante. Les sociétés de commerce international (SCI) tirent leurs revenus de la négociation des contrats, de l'ouverture de comptes de garantie bloqués destinés à amortir les retards de paiement de certains acquéreurs, de services d'assurances offerts en cas d'immobilisation des bateaux, ou encore de la gestion des monceaux de paperasse requis par les diverses législations fiscales. Par le passé, ces sociétés d'importation ont prospéré du fait de la complexité des lois propres aux différents pays en matière d'échanges commerciaux et de taxation. Mais au cours de la décennie qui vient de s'écouler, l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, l'Union européenne et d'autres instances encore ont standardisé, voire éliminé, un certain nombre de lois s'appliquant aux échanges transfrontaliers. En résulte la possibilité pour un nombre croissant d'entreprises de réaliser des transactions internationales sans faire appel à une SCI.
S'ajoute à cela un facteur nouveau : Internet, qui a permis aux entreprises de Corée d'entrer en relation directe avec les assembleurs d'outre-Atlantique. Cet accès, qui leur permet d'identifier les meilleures offres, est une prestation que, dans le monde non virtuel, Samsung facture des milliers de dollars. De fait, Samsung Electronics, numéro un mondial des fabricants de puces de mémoire, a tissé un réseau de liens Internet avec ses deux mille fournisseurs, réalisant une économie de 3 milliards de dollars (3,3 milliards d'euros) sur l'approvisionnement et les coûts de stockage. Ce faisant, la majorité des tâches jusqu'alors confiées à Samsung sont passées à la trappe. On s'explique mieux le recul de 12 %, à 366 millions de dollars (402,6 M EURO), des recettes d'exploitation liées à l'activité marchande de Samsung pour l'année 2000.
C'est le choc de la crise financière en Asie qui, en 1997, a sonné le branle-bas de combat. Alors directeur général de l'entreprise, Hyun Myung-kwan, aujourd'hui vice-président de Samsung, réunit son état-major. Objectif : trouver des solutions pour sortir des secteurs en récession et se positionner sur des marchés à fort potentiel. Lim et d'autres recommandent en particulier d'explorer la piste du Net. Hyun le charge d'étudier l'usage que la concurrence fait de la Toile, et de quelle manière Samsung pourrait en tirer profit.
Fin 1999, Lim a jeté son dévolu sur cinq places de marché capables de dégager des bénéfices sous trois ans, et n'entrant pas en concurrence frontale avec un quelconque site d'Asie. Lim affecte un budget de 50 millions de dollars (55 millions EURO) à leur développement, tout en soulignant l'impératif de nommer à leur tête des responsables riches d'au moins quinze années d'expérience dans le secteur concerné, d'une connaissance en profondeur du commerce international, et d'un gros carnet d'adresses dans le secteur en question.
Une fois par mois, Lim réunit ses directeurs de place de marché électronique pour un déjeuner de trois heures. La consigne est claire : les partenaires de ces bourses doivent également être des négociants, afin de maintenir un flux ininterrompu de commandes. Dans le cas de GSX, place de marché électronique spécialisée dans l'échange d'acier sur le marché libre, chacune des sociétés fondatrices - Samsung, Cargill, et les européens Duferco et Trade Arbed - s'est engagée à assurer au site un volume de transactions de 500 millions de dollars (550 M EURO) dans les deux années à venir.
La fin des négociateurs ?
Du côté des partenaires de Samsung, de tels engagements financiers seraient exclus si Internet ne simplifiait pas les échanges commerciaux. Prenons cette bourse de l'acier, dont Samsung a revu le processus d'enchères. Imaginons que, dans le cadre d'une transaction classique, un fabricant de tuyaux de Taïwan recherche 2 000 tonnes d'acier et contacte Samsung par téléphone pour qu'une offre lui soit soumise. Un premier négociateur se rapproche de producteurs de Russie, d'où provient 40 % de l'acier destiné au marché instantané mondial, et en examine les tarifs et les disponibilités. Un deuxième se charge simultanément de la question du transport, des entrepreneurs de manutention et de l'emmagasinage. Enfin, un troisième demande au service financier une ligne de crédit de 500 000 dollars à l'ordre du preneur, auxquels viennent s'ajouter plusieurs millions de dollars pour l'aciérie, les fabricants russes exigeant d'être réglés à l'acquisition. Ce service débloque un chèque de crédit autorisé et Samsung peut télécopier en retour une proposition dont le suivi est assuré par courrier électronique et téléphone. Quarante-huit heures se sont écoulées.
L'acquéreur décroche alors son téléphone et contacte trois ou quatre nouvelles sociétés d'importation pour mettre la main sur une offre plus intéressante. Le processus peut prendre deux semaines et multiplier par quatre le temps requis pour conclure une affaire. Souvent, l'acquéreur demande des devis sur des produits de qualités différentes, alors que le marché libre de l'acier offre un choix de plus de cent références. Cette démarche contraint les négociateurs à émettre des dizaines de télécopies pour confirmations de tarifs ou éclaircissement de points spécifiques du contrat.
Par contraste, qu'il soit marchand ou acquéreur, l'utilisateur de GSX saisit la référence du produit recherché ou proposé, les délais requis, un prix maximal garanti et une date butoir (en général vingt-quatre heures) pour le traitement de cette enchère. Les opérateurs enchérissent en temps réel. Avec ses listes de " demandes " et d'" offres ", le site évoque l'écran d'un spécialiste des opérations de change sur devises. Chaque nouvelle offre déclenche l'envoi automatique d'un message électronique à l'acquéreur et au vendeur. Selon McKinsey, les utilisateurs de GSX réalisent une économie de 8 % sur chaque transaction.
Sur chaque transaction hébergée sur son site, GSX prélève une commission de 1,8 %, soit environ deux tiers de moins que pour une opération classique. Samsung s'en accommode. " En cas de succès d'Internet, d'ici dix ans, il n'y aura plus de place pour les négociateurs chargés de monnayer les contrats. En revanche, que l'on soit acquéreur ou vendeur, on aura toujours besoin de prestataires de services ", affirme James Hong, directeur chez GSX.
Traduit de l'anglais par maxime chavanne Ken Belson et Moon Ihlwan Source : Le Monde - mercredi 12 septembre 2001
HYNIX : LE SORT DU COREEN HYNIX SUSPENDU AU SOUTIEN DES BANQUES
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LA SOCIETE GENERALE SOMME LE COREEN HYNIX DE PAYER SES DETTES
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SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS TO BENEFIT FROM WINNING HANDSET SUPPLY CONTRACT FOR ORANGE SA
Samsung Electronics, the country's largest mobile handset maker, is expected to get a boost in its foray into the European market by winning a handset supply contract for European mobile phone operator Orange SA.
Early this month, Orange announced it would combine handset purchasing across the group's subsidiaries as part of plans to save 800 million euros a year by 2003.
It said its companies in the U.K., France, Belgium and the Netherlands will order handsets from preferred producers, with 18 models from six suppliers selected for the second half of 2001.
The suppliers are Samsung, Nokia, Motorola Inc., Alcatel, Sagem and Sony Corp.
Analysts said Samsung is likely to solidify its brand and product recognition in the GSM-standard European market through the deal with Orange.
Samsung is estimated to be the fifth largest mobile phone manufacturer in the world. It entered the European market in late 1997 on the strength of the fast-growing domestic market.
Separately, Samsung Electronics and mobile technology firm Qualcomm of the U.S. are believed to be considering setting up a venture to manufacture CDMA (code division multiple access) handsets in India.
In addition to Samsung's intention to make inroads into the Indian market, the company said last week it agreed to supply DRAM chips used in mobile phones to Nokia, the world's top handset maker.
DRAM chips, though not widely used in mobile phones now, are expected to expand into high-end wireless handsets in the near future.
Currently, low-capacity SRAM (static random access memory) chips have been used in most mobile phones, but analysts said DRAM will be increasingly favored because it can offer higher memory capacity.
Samsung was also in talks to supply DRAM mobile chips to U.S. wireless technology giant Motorola and German technology group Siemens AG .
Source by: Korea Herald (2001.08.22)
SAMSUNG, ORANGE SIGN MOBILE PHONE CONTRACT
Samsung Electronics announced yesterday it signed contracts with Orange, a global mobile phone operator based in Europe, for the supply and expansion of mobile networks based on GSM technology.
The financial terms of the deal were not disclosed. However, Samsung officials predicted millions of handset are expected to be sold in the foreseeable future, given Orange's attraction of seven million new subscribers in the second half of last year.
Samsung Electronics won the contract with six mobile phone makers, including Nokia, Motorola and Sony, while existing suppliers such as Ericsson, Siemens and NEC were unable to receive new contracts.
Market monitoring firm International Data Corp. (IDC) recently reported that Samsung Electronics ranked as one of the world's top five hand set makers in terms of volume.
IDC said Nokia sold 21.42 million handsets last year in the Asia-Pacific region. Motorola was a distant second with a 20 percent market share of 14 million handsets. Then came Samsung, Sweden's Ericsson and Siemens of Germany.
With its second-generation services on wireless application protocol (WAP), and soon to be offered general packet radio system (GPRS), Orange is developing and delivering a life style portfolio of mobile services.
These services will include mobile e-mail, mobile payment systems and financial services; interactive information, news and shopping services, location-based travel, on-line booking and related services, entertainment services and e-commerce.
Orange, which expanded in line with the integration of France Telecom's mobile phone operations, has about 16 million mobile phone subscribers in France, where it is No. 1 in the market, and about 12 million in the UK, where it is the No. 2 wireless carrier after Vodafone.
Orange will have 10 Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), the name for the 3G mobile telephone standard developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in Europe. That includes the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Portugal. It has operating interests in 20 countries worldwide with over 33 million customers.
kdh@koreatimes.co.kr Source : Korea Times - 21/8/2001
FRENCH FIRM'S FAULTY TURBINES COST BORYEONG PLANT W1 TRIL.
KEPCO, the state-run utility company, has been involved in purchasing generators from the French company Alstom which are said not to work. As a result W1 trillion has been squandered by a combined-cycle thermal power plant, which has delayed its commissioning for nearly three years.
According to Ahn Young-keun, assembly member of the opposition Grand National Party Tuesday, the Korea Electric Power Corp. purchased the generators from Alstom back in 1996 to be installed in a combined-cycle, thermal plant located in Boryeong in Chungnam Province. But the power generation has yet to be completed, even though the power plant was dedicated about two years ago, due to the defects in the generators.
In response, KEPCO explained that it is true that KEPCO has been unable to generate power at the Boryeong plant which invested a total of W915 billion in construction costs for about two years and eight months.
KEPCO said it has found a structural defect in the generators. The company said all defects will be corrected by the end of July 2002.
The utility monopoly said it will soon file a compensation lawsuit against Alstom for its losses.
The generators were originally manufactured by Asea Brown Boveri of Switzerland, but Alstom took over ABB and its contracts.
ABB had been selected in an international auction back in 1996 and the company had supplied eight units of gas turbines and four steam turbines.
The plant has been expected to supply 1.8 million kWs of power starting from early 1999, but because of serious troubles in the generators, the formal operation has all been suspended since the construction of the plant was completed at the end of 1998.
One KEPCO official in charge of the construction of the plant said the power generation at the Boryeong plant has been suspended despite his company having already demanded Alstom to fix the defects, starting from 1997, but Alstom has been dragging its feet.
KEPCO was found to have paid more than 90 percent of the costs of the generators, but failed to be compensated for the suspended power generation.
Industry observers said Alstom's generators have been known as an unproven product, not verified for commercial operations globally.
Commenting on the design defects one KEPCO official said about 61 generators have been scattered around the world and are in operation and Alston has been providing a large defect-correction service, as quite many of the generators have caused trouble.
A concerned official at the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy said that the state-run KEPCO is in charge of the operation of the Boryeong plant and in recognition of the defects, the ministry has given the go-ahead to postpone the date of the plant's opening to November of this year.
KEPCO explained that the company will go through a series of negotiations with Alstom and plans to demand a total of W50 million in damage compensation.
Meanwhile, the National Intelligence Service was reported to have begun an investigation on the KEPCO unit in charge of purchasing and building the Boyreong plant.
Source by: Chosun Ilbo (2001.08.23)
LA COREE RECLAME 52,8M$ A ALSTOM POUR DEFAILLANCE MATERIEL
Le Gouvernement coréen réclame 52,8 millions de dollars au fournisseur d'électricité Alstom en compensation de la défaillance d'un générateur fourni par sa filiale ABB Alstom et ayant causé la panne d'une station électrique thermique. La station aurait ainsi généré à peine 1% de ses capacités depuis sa mise en service il y a 32 mois, selon la presse asiatique. Le Ministre coréen du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Energie a toutefois déclaré qu'Alstom s'était déjà acquitté de 20,33 millions de dollars et que les dégâts ne pourront être exactement chiffrés avant juillet prochain. Contactée par AOF, la porte-parole d'Alstom n'était pas disponible pour commenter ces informations.
Source : AOF le 23/08/2001
